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Abstract—Reactive defense mechanisms, such as intrusion
detection systems, have made significant efforts to secure a system
or network for the last several decades. However, the nature of
reactive security mechanisms has limitations because potential
attackers cannot be prevented in advance. We are facing a
reality with the proliferation of persistent, advanced, intelligent
attacks while defenders are often way behind attackers in taking
appropriate actions to thwart potential attackers. The concept
of moving target defense (MTD) has emerged as a proactive
defense mechanism aiming to prevent attacks. In this work,
we conducted a comprehensive, in-depth survey to discuss the
following aspects of MTD: key roles, design principles, classifica-
tions, common attacks, key methodologies, important algorithms,
metrics, evaluation methods, and application domains. We discuss
the pros and cons of all aspects of MTD surveyed in this work.
Lastly, we highlight insights and lessons learned from this study
and suggest future work directions. The aim of this paper is
to provide the overall trends of MTD research in terms of
critical aspects of defense systems for researchers who seek for
developing proactive, adaptive MTD mechanisms.
Index Terms—Moving target defense, proactive defense, cyber-
security, attack surface, shuffling, diversity, redundancy
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
In the classic “shell game,” dating at least to the times of
ancient Greece, a pea or ball is hidden under one of three
shells or cups, and players gamble to guess the location of the
pea after the shells have been moved. This game is also known
as “thimblerig,” “three shells and a pea,” and the “old army
game” and has variant forms, such as “Three-card Monte.”
The advantage for the operator of the game is that sufficient
movement of the shells will confuse the players of the location
of the pea. This underlying idea exemplifies the philosophy
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of the so-called “Moving Target Defense (MTD)” strategy in
cybersecurity [112].
The basic axiom of MTD is that it is impossible to provide
complete and perfect security for a given system. Given this,
the objective is to enable normal functioning of the system
(i.e., the normal provision of services) even in the presence
of malicious actors seeking to compromise the system. Since
attacks cannot be prevented, the goal is to defend against and
thwart attacks. In practice, this goal is achieved via MTD by
the manipulation of multiple system configurations to modify
and control the attack surface, where the attacker engages with
the system. MTD aims to increase uncertainty and complexity
for any attacker of the system, to decrease the opportunities
for the attacker to identify targets (e.g., vulnerable system
components), and to introduce higher cost in launching attacks
or scans (e.g., reconnaissance attacks). The desired result is
that the attacker will waste time and effort without gaining
useful intelligence about the system [69, 112].
Origins of the conception of MTD can be found under
different names in the computer security literature. Some of
these research areas include fault tolerance (or reliability using
redundancy) even since the 1970’s (e.g., n-version program-
ming (NVP) [12, 27]), reconfigurable computing (e.g., recon-
figurable software [37], network reconfiguration [17]), and/or
bio-inspired cybersecurity (e.g., software / network diversity
for cybersecurity [90, 91]). In 2009, the Networking and
Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD)
Program explicitly emphasized the concept of MTD in terms
of its effectiveness and efficiency, which can leverage existing
resources [58]. Since then, a fast-growing research community
has formed with a focus on MTD, and many initial works have
received significant attention due to its fascinating approach
and merit. However, there has been relatively less effort to
comprehensively understand the overall trends in terms of
MTD classifications, attacks handled by MTD, metrics used to
measure the performance of MTD techniques, and associated
limitations of the existing MTD technologies. An overall in-
depth understanding of MTD techniques will guide us to
identify what aspects lack in existing MTD approaches and
accordingly what directions should be pursued for future
research. This is the aim of our survey paper.
B. Comparison of Our Work and Existing MTD Survey Papers
As significant attention has been paid to this emerging field
of research in the past ten years, some efforts have been
made to understand the state-of-the-art MTD technologies.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
08
09
2v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 12
 Se
p 2
01
9
2TABLE I
COMPARISON OF THE KEY CONTRIBUTIONS OF OUR SURVEY PAPER COMPARED TO OTHER EXISTING SURVEY PAPERS.
Criteria Our Survey Cai et al.(2016) [22]
Ward et al.
(2018) [157]
Lei et al.
(2018) [94]
Zheng and Namin
(2019) [166]
Sengupta et al.
(2019) [134]
Principle questions not addressed (Q1-Q5) Q1, Q4, Q5 Q1-Q3, Q5 Q5 Q5 Q4
Categorization/Classification in the Survey (Classified and Surveyed (3) - Surveyed but not Classified (S-only) - Neither Classifies nor Surveyed (7))
Evaluation of effectiveness and efficiency of MTD 3 3 3 3 Partially 3
Key Design Principles
(WHAT to move, WHEN to move, HOW to move) 3 3 S-only 7 3 3
Application Domain
(Cloud, IoT, etc.)
Cloud, SDNs, IoT,
CPSs, Enterprise S-only S-only
Cloud, SDNs,
IoT
Cloud, SDNs,
IoT 3
Combination of MTD techniques vs
different layers (as Table III) 3 7 7 7 7 7
Types of Attack behaviors
(such as attacker knowledge: Intelligent or not) 3 S-only 7 3
Partially
(Only attack types)
3
Types of evaluation methods 3 3 S-only 3 7 3
Discussing Key concept of MTD
(deception vs. MTD) 3 Partially 7 Partially 3 Partially
Discussing Limitation, Pros and Cons of MTD Techniques
Discussing Key Limitations/
Pros and Cons of Techniques 3 7 Partially 7 7 Partially
Discussion for insights and future directions
of MTD literature Comprehensive Partially 7 3 Partially 3
We compared our survey paper and the existing survey papers
in terms of their contributions, key design, and classification
together with the following principal questions:
Q1: What attacks are considered more/less likely to be
handled by existing MTD techniques?
Q2: What MTD techniques are more commonly explored?
Q3: What theoretical and empirical methodologies are used
in developing and/or evaluating MTD techniques?
Q4: What specific limitations are identified in using a
particular technique?
Q5: What metrics are unavailable to measure the key
effectiveness of MTD techniques in terms of system security
and performance?
We discussed the contributions of each survey paper on MTD
based on the main criteria and principle questions in Table I.
MIT Lincoln Lab published a technical report providing an
extensive survey on MTD in 2013 [113], with a substantially
expanded and updated edition five years later [157]. Both
surveys are very helpful for readers interested in learning
each MTD technique with the classification based on ‘what
to move’ in deploying MTD. Specifically, they classified
MTD techniques under five categories: dynamic data, dynamic
software, dynamic runtime environments, dynamic platforms,
and dynamic networks. The second edition [157] particularly
includes an extensive list of MTD techniques for each cate-
gory. Consequently, they provided the types of attacks based
on the classified MTD. In our survey, we also categorize the
MTD based on techniques and operational layers which covers
the taxonomies used by [157] as well as provides the ways in
which those techniques can be combined together. The authors
described each technique under these criteria, which is useful
as a manual description of the techniques. However, this kind
of survey does not provide the succinct overall summary and
trends of the MTD research field that would enable the readers
to discover answers to the principal questions (e.g., Q1-Q5).
On the other hand, our survey paper aims to answer these
questions.
Farris and Cybenko [48] studied the existing MTD tech-
niques to quantify their cost and effectiveness through an
expert opinion survey. They reached 120 cyber defense experts
and evaluated 39 MTD techniques. They ranked the most seven
dominant ones based on the quantification criteria in terms of
cost against effectiveness. They found that the best MTD tech-
niques in terms of operating costs and the overall effectiveness
are the techniques using address space layout or instruction set
randomization while the worst is one performing network ran-
domization. Although their evaluation for quantifying costs are
well-evaluated based on the implementation and performance
costs, their consideration for quantifying the effectiveness of
MTD techniques is limited to the attacker’s workload. They
do not explicitly define what the effectiveness is in terms of
other important security metrics. Moreover, a set of studied
literature is limited to only 39 papers in which only 23 of
them are opted as dominant studies and used for the survey.
Cai et al. [22] also conducted an extensive survey on
the state-of-the-art MTD research by describing theoretical
approaches, strategies based on key characteristics, and eval-
uation methods used in those existing MTD approaches. The
authors provided a function-and-movement model categorizing
MTD techniques in a systematic way in terms of (1) three
layers of implementation including software, running platform,
and physical network; (2) function and movement models; and
(3) MTD, its strategies, and its evaluation. However, from
the reader’s perspective, it is challenging to understand the
principle questions Q1 and Q4-Q5. Although this classification
covers a large portion of literature, it misses other perspectives
of MTD such as testbeds, a combinations of MTD techniques,
attack types, and the aforementioned limitations. In our survey
paper, these three questions are answered in Sections III, V,
and VII, respectively.
3Recently, Lei et al. [94] published a survey paper on MTD
techniques. Although the authors conducted extensive surveys
of the existing MTD techniques in terms of strategy gener-
ation, shuffling implementation, and performance evaluation,
this work missed many MTD taxonomies to categorize and
understand the existing MTD techniques. This work also did
not survey an in-depth security analysis of MTD techniques
based on well-known security metrics used to evaluate the
current state-of-the-art MTD approaches. The MTD classifi-
cation used in [94] is based on multiple criteria, such as the
theoretical basis (e.g., game theory, machine learning, genetic
algorithms), the techniques (e.g., transformation or shuffling
of system configurations), and the purpose of existing MTD
approaches, which lack the consistent perspective to classify
and analyze the existing MTD works. Due to this reason, one
may need to have a more consistent classification to clearly
understand the overall trends of MTD research and easily
obtain insights from the existing MTD methodologies.
Zheng and Namin [166] published a survey paper on
architectural aspects of the MTD techniques based on appli-
cation, operating system, and network levels. They classified
various types of MTD techniques, including software diversi-
fication via middle-ware, address space layout randomization,
instruction set randomization, IP randomization, virtualization,
decoys, and software-defined or lightweight based MTDs, at
different levels. However, they did not clearly distinguish
MTD techniques from MTD architectures. For instance, soft-
ware diversification, address space layout randomization, or
IP randomization are MTD techniques while middle-ware
based software diversification and software-defined MTD are
the MTD deployment architectures. In addition, they did not
discuss targeted attackers characteristics, evaluation methods,
and suitable metrics of the existing MTD techniques, which
we addressed in this survey paper.
Very recently, Sengupta et al. [134] conducted a substantial
survey to study and categorize the proposed defensive MTD
tools, techniques, and strategies. The authors categorized MTD
approaches in a structured way and introduced MTD tax-
onomies based on the following technique formalism: design-
ing key movements, implementation of MTD (e.g., testbeds),
and evaluation of MTD effectiveness (e.g., qualitative and
quantities metrics). However, some critical aspects of the
implementation layers and combinations of MTD techniques
were missing in their classification. On the other hand, our sur-
vey paper here classified MTD techniques based on Table III
consisting of MTD techniques categorization and the layer of
implementation.
The existing MTD survey papers [22, 94, 113, 134, 157,
166] have provided different perspectives of MTD classifi-
cations and highly useful information overall. However, they
missed some important information that may be highly needed
for researchers who want to start conducting MTD research.
The common examples may include measurement methods,
metrics, common attackers countermeasured by MTD, dis-
tinctions between MTD and other defense mechanisms (e.g.,
defensive deception, intrusion detection) along with the discus-
sions of pros and cons for each MTD techniques and MTD
specific for different system environments, which we tried to
cover all in our survey paper. To effectively demonstrate the
commonalities and differences between our survey paper and
the existing survey papers, we created a table summarizing
their comparisons in Table I.
Furthermore, strictly speaking, MTD is different from de-
ception in that it does not intentionally provide false infor-
mation to deceive an attacker while deception does, even if
these two approaches may lead to a similar outcome, such as
confusing the attacker and misleading the attacker’s decision
making process. All the existing survey papers discussed
above [22, 94, 113, 157] treat deception techniques as a
subset of MTD techniques. On the other hand, the deception
research community treats MTD as a subset of deception
techniques [119]. Often times, deception is combined with
MTD in which deception is used to change the attack surface.
Hence, in our survey paper, we take deception techniques
(e.g., decoy nodes, honeypots / honeynets, fake information
dissemination on system configuration) as the part of MTD
techniques only when they are used to change the attack
surface, which is the key concept of MTD. We will discuss
more details of the differences between these two techniques
in Section III-C.
C. Key Contributions & Scope
Unlike the existing survey papers on MTD, our survey paper
has the following novel key contributions:
• We extensively surveyed the state-of-the-art MTD technolo-
gies and classified them based on three operation types:
shuffling, diversity, and redundancy (SDR). This classifi-
cation was first defined in our prior work [69] but has
not been used to extensively survey the existing MTD
techniques. Hence, this work is the first to examine the
overall trends of existing MTD techniques based on this
classification type. We chose this classification type because
it can embrace MTD techniques across different systems (or
networks) layers as long as they have the common goal(s) to
achieve. We discuss more about the operation-based MTD
classification in Section III-B.
• We investigated what types of attack behaviors are addressed
by the state-of-the-art MTD techniques. In particular, we
discussed them in the context of the operation-based classi-
fication (i.e,, shuffling, diversity, and redundancy). In addi-
tion, we discussed the limitations of current attack models.
• We discussed the key distinct contributions of MTD tech-
nologies compared to conventional security counterparts. We
discussed the differences and commonalities between MTD
and cyberdeception, whose concepts are often confused as
being an MTD, since the distinction between the two has
not been clarified in the literature.
• We surveyed what specific methodologies or algorithms are
leveraged to develop MTD techniques, which embrace three
major theoretical backgrounds of those MTD approaches,
including game theory, genetic algorithms, and machine
learning.
• We also surveyed various types of evaluation methods used
to validate the performance of MTD techniques, including
analytical models, simulation, emulation, and real testbed
environments.
4• We surveyed metrics used to assess the quality (i.e, per-
formance and security) of MTD techniques considering
the measures in terms of the perspective of attackers or
defenders.
• We examined how MTD technologies have been applied in
various application domains, including enterprise networks,
Internet-of-Things (IoT), cyber-physical systems (CPSs),
software defined networks (SDNs), and cloud computing.
• Lastly, we discussed insights and limitations obtained from
this extensive survey and suggested future work directions
based on lessons learned from this study.
D. Paper Structure
This paper is organized as follows:
• Section II discusses the key roles and design principles of
MTD techniques.
• Section III discusses the existing MTD classifications types.
• Section IV discusses MTD techniques under the classi-
fication of operation-based MTD consisting of shuffling,
diversity, and redundancy. Additionally, we discuss existing
hybrid approaches using the mixture of these techniques.
• Section V describes attack behaviors handled by existing
MTD approaches. In addition, we address the limitations
of current attack models considered by the existing MTD
approaches.
• Section VI provides the existing MTD techniques developed
by the following theoretical approaches: (1) game theory; (2)
genetic algorithms; and (3) machine learning.
• Section VII surveys metrics used to evaluate the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of MTD approaches in terms of
perspectives of either attackers or defenders.
• Section VIII gives the overall description of evaluation
methods used to validate existing MTD techniques, in-
cluding: (1) analytical models; (2) simulation models; (3)
emulation models; and (4) real testbeds.
• Section IX provides the overall trends of how MTD tech-
niques are applied under different application domains
including: (1) enterprise networks; (2) Internet-of-Things
(IoT); (3) cyber-physical systems (CPSs); (4) software de-
fined networks (SDNs); and (5) cloud-based web services.
• Section X discusses the limitations of the existing MTD
approaches covered in this work.
• Section XI discusses the insights and lessons learned from
our study and suggests future research directions in the area
of MTD research.
II. KEY ROLES & DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF MTD
In this section, we provide backgrounds and key design
principles of MTD. We discuss the two major roles of MTD in
terms of the intrusion prevention mechanism and the detection
of potential attackers. In addition, we clarified the design
principles of MTD with three key questions, and summarized
benefits and caveats of applying MTD techniques.
A. Key Roles
MTD can contribute to enhancing the security provided by
an intrusion defense system (IDS) in two ways. First, MTD
acts as an intrusion prevention mechanism by reducing the risk
of potential intrusions to the system. Many MTD techniques,
including Internet Protocol (IP) mutation, network topology
changes, platform migration, and software stack shuffling,
change the attack surface, thereby minimizing the potential of
attackers in their discovery of vulnerable system components
and in their attempts to penetrate into the system.
Second, MTD can assist in the detection of potential at-
tackers. Since MTD techniques can increase the complexity of
an attack operation to identify a target, the intelligence about
attack patterns or behaviors of potential attackers can be easily
obtained by monitoring active activities (e.g., scanning) by the
potential attackers. This allows MTD techniques, categorized
as intrusion protection mechanisms, to also indirectly assist an
intrusion detection system to improve the detection of potential
attacks.
As Table II describes, compared to the characteristics of
the conventional security techniques, MTD aims to provide
affordable, service-oriented defense in terms of minimizing
defense cost (e.g., communication or computation overhead),
maximizing service availability to users, and meeting a re-
quired level of security. In particular, the underlying idea
of MTD lies in ‘affordable defense’ because it focuses on
rearranging system configurations to confuse attackers while
still employing existing security mechanisms. This means
that MTD does not require the development of new security
mechanisms, which often need to go through tough, high-
standard security analysis and accordingly may require an
excessive amount of time or effort. Therefore, MTD provides a
new way of defense that continues to leverage legacy resources
but enhances security by dynamically changing the attack
surface, such as any aspects of system components (e.g.,
data, software, platforms, runtime environments, networks) to
increase uncertainty and confusion for attackers.
B. Key Design Principles
MTD was introduced as a proactive defense mechanism to
prevent cyberattacks by continuously and dynamically chang-
ing the attack surface of systems [58]. The fundamental design
principle for developing MTD techniques lies in the decisions
for the following three key questions [22]: what to move, how
to move, and when to move.
• What to move: ‘What to move’ refers to what system
configuration attribute (i.e., attack surface) can be dynami-
cally changed to confuse attackers. The example system or
network attributes that can be changed include instruction
sets [86, 123], address space layouts [135], IP addresses [3,
10, 79, 88, 138], port numbers [97], proxies [83], virtual
machines [165, 20], operating systems [148], or software
programs [76]. Table III summarizes the moving elements
by MTD techniques in different system layers [4, 69]. A
change in the system configuration attributes must cause
a change on the attack surface of the system leading to
the loss of work and increased complexity for attackers.
Additionally, the number of possible values the dynamic
attribute can change to must be vast, thwarting the attacker’s
ability to simply brute-force the future value [22].
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COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE VS. MTD
Conventional Defense MTD
Philosophy Building a secure system by covering all vulnerabilities is
the key for security
It is impossible to build a perfectly secure system
Goal Make a system perfectly secure Thwart attackers by changing attack surface
Defense Type Static defense using static system configurations fortifying
assets and hardening defense systems
Dynamic defense using dynamic system configurations to
build a agile system
Key Concern How to identify all potential system security vulnerabilities
and eliminate them
How to optimally execute MTD operations to continuously
change attack surface while meeting multiple system
objectives concerning security and performance
Challenges Due to limited capability to detect all exhaustive, possible
vulnerabilities and their high complexity, it is unfeasible to
identify all possible vulnerabilities
Optimally executing MTD operations is not a trivial task
because frequently executing MTD operations is costly and
often hurts service availability to users
Fig. 1. Examples of MTD techniques based shuffling, diversity, or redundancy.
TABLE III
MOVING ELEMENTS OF MTD TECHNIQUES AT DIFFERENT LAYERS
MTD TechniquesLayers Shuffling Diversity Redundancy
Web: Appache, IIS, GWS etc. Web service replica
App: .Net Framework, Java, PHP etc. Application replica
Database: SQL server, MySQL, Oracle etc. Database backup and replicaApplication TCP/UDP port numbers
Others: Mail-server, Proxy-server etc. Other service replica
Windows: Windows server 2003/2008, Windows 9.x, 8, 10 etc.
Linux: Redhat, Debian, Caldera etc.
SolarisOS-Host IP address
Others: Unix, HP-UX etc.
VM-Instance Virtual IP address Same as OS
Host OS and virtual machine replica
Xen
Vmware
ESXiVirtual Machine Manager (VMM) Failover, Switchover
Others: Kernel-based VM (KVM), Virtual-box (Vbox), IBM vSphere
Hypervisor’s replica
Intel
HP
Sun SolarisHardware Hardware replacement
Others: ARM, Atmega
Hardware backups and replica
• How to move: ‘How to move’ defines how to change the
moving attributes (i.e., targets) to increase unpredictability
and/or uncertainty, leading to an attacker’s high confusion.
This is related to the three operation-based MTD classi-
fication components: shuffling, diversity, and redundancy
(SDR). Common MTD techniques include artificial diver-
sity [20, 72, 76, 129, 152] or randomizations [3, 10, 79,
83, 86, 88, 97, 100, 135, 138, 143, 156], which rearrange
or randomize the various system and network attributes
where each work can belong to shuffling, diversity, and/or
redundancy techniques. Fig. 1 depicts examples of how to
move the moving elements using MTD based on the SDR
classification [4, 69].
• When to move: ‘When to move’ involves deciding the
optimal time to change from the current state of an MTD
system to a new state, invalidating information or progress
gained by an attacker in the current state. The three com-
mon types of adaptations are reactive, proactive, or hybrid
strategies. The reactive adaptation is based on an event
or an alert that executes the adaptation as a response
to a message from the detection of suspicious activity.
Reactive MTD attempts to counter actions taken by an
attacker under the assumption that the attacker’s actions are
detected. The proactive adaptation triggers MTD techniques
by changing configurations or properties on a schedule,
with either fixed or random intervals between adaptations.
Proactive adaptations ensure that any information gained by
6Fig. 2. An example of an adaptive MTD: A blue vertical line represents a
proactive MTD which is triggered at fixed MTD interval whereas a red line
presents a reactive MTD which is triggered on an event (e.g, an intrusion
detection alert).
the attacker quickly expires [100], thus regular movement is
important. Proactive MTD moves regardless of the presence
of an attacker costing additional delay in the protected
system. The hybrid adaptation is based on both reactive
and proactive features, wherein the time interval to trigger
an MTD operation is adaptive upon certain events or security
alerts while the interval is also bounded in length to prevent
potential, undetected security threats [171]. Fig. 2 shows
an example of ‘when to move’ which addresses at what
time point the element(s) of MTD can be moved under
hybrid adaptations [4, 69]. In Fig. 2, a blue line means an
MTD can be triggered at a fixed MTD interval whereas
an orange line shows an MTD triggered by an event (e.g.,
an intrusion detection alert). Intuitively, we can notice that
using the fixed MTD interval is more proactive than using
the adaptive MTD interval in confusing attackers. However,
high frequency of MTD operations may incur high cost.
Hence, an optimal MTD interval can be identified at run-
time to balance both cost and security. A running system
can have different moving elements (e.g., IP, Port, OS, VM,
Applications) over the time, and their changes can take place
either at a regular fixed interval of time or upon receiving
an intrusion detection alert.
C. Discussions: Benefits and Caveats of MTD
In this section, we discuss the key benefits of MTD and
caveats in developing MTD techniques, in relation with the
roles and design principles of MTD techniques.
The key benefits of MTD techniques include as follows:
• Providing affordable defense opportunities. Compared
to conventional security mechanisms aiming to perfectly
eliminate any vulnerabilities and risks that can be introduced
by attackers, MTD provides a new perspective of a defense
system by continuously changing the attack surface, which
makes it harder for attackers to achieve their goals. MTD
allows us to leverage legacy system components and existing
technologies, enabling a greater likelihood of achieving
affordable defense solutions and avoiding the necessity of
creating a new, highly robust security mechanism, such
as cryptographic solutions, which requires more resource
/ time to develop but may be less applicable in broad
Time-based Event-based Hybrid-based
Timeliness-based MTD
Fig. 3. Classifications of Timeliness-based MTD.
contexts (e.g., under the assumption of trusted entities for
key management).
• Providing another layer of defense in cooperation with
existing defense mechanisms. At the same time, MTD
can cooperate with other defense mechanisms by assisting
in intrusion detection that can thwart potential attackers
and/or provide new attack patterns observed during the
reconnaissance stage of the attack. In addition, MTD can
add another layer of defense when a defensive deception is
used to deceive an attacker. In particular, when the attacker
realized the deception and can successfully identify vulner-
able system component, not being lured by the deception
(e.g., a honeypot), MTD can be executed to migrate the
system platform in order to invalidate the information of
the system vulnerabilities collected by the attacker in the
current system configuration.
However, we also need to be aware of the following caveats
in developing MTD techniques:
• High frequency of triggering MTD operation may signifi-
cantly hinder seamless, quality service provision to users.
This issue is related to a design principle related to ‘when
to move’ a target because triggering MTD operations too
often naturally leads to reducing service availability and/or
interrupting seamless service provision.
• Non-adaptive, non-intelligent MTD may waste defense
cost while not decreasing system vulnerabilities. In some
system / network settings, resources are highly constrained,
such as IoT environments or mobile, wireless networks. The
strategy in deciding how to expend defense resources is
critical to prolonging system lifetime and increase system
reliability (or survivability). If a deployed MTD is not
adaptively and/or intelligently executed based on a level of
detected security vulnerabilities, then the required system
goals, such as minimizing defense cost and maintaining a
certain level of system security, may not be met.
• How to execute MTD operations in resource-constrained,
distributed network environments has not been suf-
ficiently studied in the literature. Most existing MTD
approaches consider a trusted third party for network
management associated with running an MTD technique.
However, in some decentralized or distributed, resource-
constrained environments, such as mobile ad hoc networks,
wireless sensor networks, or IoT networks, it is not easy
to identify a trusted infrastructure that can make critical
decisions on MTD executions. Further, the cost of executing
MTD operations should be considered as a priority as those
contested environments can only afford highly lightweight
MTD solutions.
7III. CLASSIFICATION TYPES OF MTD
MTD techniques have been studied under various classifi-
cations with different criteria. In this section, we discuss how
the MTD techniques have been classified in the literature. In
addition, we distinguish the concepts of MTD from those of
deception and discuss what the commonalities and differences
are between them.
A. Timeliness-based MTD
Timeliness-based MTD classifies MTD techniques based on
criteria to determine ‘when to move.’ Fig. 3 depicts the three
common timeliness-based MTD categories as follows:
• Time-based: This approach triggers an MTD operation
based on a certain time interval called the MTD interval
which can be a fixed interval or a variable interval [22].
With a fixed time interval, the MTD mechanism periodically
changes the attack surface (e.g., IP/Port addresses, OS
rotation, VM migration) with a constant equal time which
remains unchanged. If the interval time is too large, then an
attacker may be allowed a sufficient amount of time to scan
a system and then penetrate into the system, resulting in a
security breach. On the other hand, if the interval time is too
small, then the MTD triggers even when there is no attack
on the system, wasting defense resources and degrading
performance. Therefore, determining the MTD interval time
to perform an MTD operation has a significant impact on the
effectiveness and efficiency of a given MTD technique [23].
• Event-based: This approach performs an MTD operation
only when a certain event occurs. The event can encompass
any indication an attacker accesses a system or attempts
to launch a certain attack. That is, if the defender can
accurately predict potential attacks, then events can trigger
the appropriate MTD operation. In order to discover the key
events that should trigger the MTD action, attack prediction
based adaptive MTD approaches have been proposed using
machine learning [36], game theory [168], and control
theory [129].
• Hybrid: Some MTD approaches take a hybrid strategy.
These approaches [87, 129, 170, 171] execute MTD
operations adaptively based on both the time and event-
based MTD strategies for proactive and reactive adaptations,
respectively.
B. Operation-based MTD
Operation-based MTD classifies MTD techniques based on
criteria to determine ‘how to move’. Hong and Kim [69]
labeled three types of MTD techniques based on the nature
of the operations: shuffling, diversity, and redundancy. Each
type is detailed as follows:
• Shuffling: This technique rearranges or randomizes system
configurations, such as mutating IP addresses at a TCP/IP
layer or dynamically adjusting the migration time of VMs.
The key goal of these shuffling-based MTD techniques is
to increase confusion and uncertainty for attackers (i.e., to
make the identification of vulnerable targets more difficult)
by making information collected by the attackers obsolete or
Shuffling
Diversity
Redundancy
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Resilience / Robustness
Reliability / Availability
Fig. 4. Relationships between Shuffling, Diversity and Redundancy (SDR).
by wasting attackers resources in the collection of useless in-
formation. Ultimately, shuffling-based MTD can prevent or
delay the attackers from accessing a target system. Because
the system earns more time to monitor the attack behaviors
(e.g., scanning attacks), the system’s defense mechanisms
(e.g., IDS) can prepare more intelligent strategies to deal
with the attack based on identified attacks.
• Diversity: This technique employs the deployment of system
components with different implementations that provide
the same functionalities. The examples include the use of
diverse paths for routing or the change of platforms consist-
ing of different implementation of software components or
migration between different platforms (i.e, software stacks
and/or hardware). Diversity-based MTD aims to enhance
system resilience by increasing fault-tolerance in that the
system can provide normal services in the presence of
attackers in the system.
• Redundancy: This technique provides multiple replicas of
system (or network) components, such as multiple paths
between nodes in a network layer or multiple software com-
ponents providing the same functionality at the application
layer. The key aim of redundancy-based MTD is to increase
system dependability (e.g., reliability or availability) by
providing redundant ways of providing the same services
when some of the network nodes or system components
are compromised. In this sense, redundancy contributes to
increasing system (or network) resilience in the presence
of insider threats. This technique can often be combined
with diversity-based MTD so that, for example, redundant
services are available where the attackers are required to
know additional credentials or intelligence to use other al-
ternative components (e.g., different or additional credentials
or a different level of privileges).
Although these three types of MTD operations can be
used to classify MTD techniques (see Section IV), they often
support each other directly or indirectly in realizing their
respective goals. We summarize the connections between the
SDR types and their goals in Fig. 4.
First, the concept of diversity is adopted from the principle
that the diversity of system components can enhance security
(i.e., software polyculture enhances security [50, 56, 147]),
leading to high system resilience (or robustness) even in the
8presence of attacks. If system diversity is high, there exists
a variety of alternatives to the provision of the same service,
such as multiple routes from a source to a destination to deliver
a message.
Second, shuffling also can enhance diversity because how to
rearrange system components can affect the degree of system
diversity. For example, a platform migration using a shuffling
technique leads to higher diversity. How to shuffle targets is
closely related to how much cost incurs from shuffling the
targets and, accordingly, how much it can enhance security
or interrupt services to normal users. The effectiveness of
shuffling is also affected by how diverse a target is in nature.
For example, given a network, we want to increase the number
of different types of software that provides the same set of
services. But if we only have one or two software types, then
there is an inherent limitation of the performance achievable
by the shuffling operation. On the other hand, if the shuffling is
optimally performed, system diversity also increases, leading
to higher system resilience against attacks.
Finally, high diversity and effective shuffling are critical
to increasing redundancy for achieving higher reliability (or
availability) while properly dealing with attackers. Particularly,
if redundancy is high with low diversity due to a poor or no
shuffling technique, it can be also leveraged by the attackers
to persistently use alternate ways to get into the system.
Therefore, these three types of techniques, shuffling, diversity,
and redundancy, namely SDR, impact each other and should be
considered in combination to properly enhance system security
or resilience.
C. MTD vs. Deception
MTD and deception techniques have been used without
clear distinction. To clarify this distinction, we briefly describe
what deception is and how it has been used as a defensive
technique in the literature. More importantly, we discuss
what are different and common between MTD and defensive
deception in terms of their purposes and strategies.
1) Defensive Deception: In military settings, deception is
originally derived from actions to be executed to intentionally
mislead an opponent’s decision associated with strengths and
weakness of military capacities, intents, and/or operations.
Defensive deception is created to affect an attacker’s action in
a way a defender wants to achieve its mission [139]. Deception
has been studied based on a number of classifications.
Bell and Whaley [19] and Almeshekah and Spafford [8]
discuss deception techniques in terms of either ‘hiding the
real’ or ‘showing the false.’ That is, the defender can mod-
ify information and/or present misleading information to the
attacker. For example, the defender can mislead the attackers
to misjudge by providing a false sense that the attacker has
complete, certain, relevant information for its decision making,
which is not true indeed.
Caddell [21] classifies deception in terms of ‘passive decep-
tion’ and ‘active deception.’ The passive deception includes
actions to hide capabilities or intents from the attacker. The
active deception involves leading the attacker to form false
beliefs by providing false information. Daniel and Herbig [42]
introduce two types of deception techniques based on their
goals, aiming to increase an attacker’s perceived ambiguity
and to mislead the attacker to misjudge.
Rahman et al. [126] proposed a game-theoretic approach
using Nash equilibrium strategy as a deception technique to
prevent remote OS fingerprinting attacks. They showed that
the designed technique named DeceiveGame can significantly
decrease the fingerprinter attack success probability while the
overall usability of the system is preserved without perfor-
mance degradation. Bell and Whaley [19] and Almeshekah and
Spafford [8] show some other example deception techniques
that dissimulate information in order to hide real information
and simulate information to make the attacker form false
beliefs. Examples of dissimulation deception are masking (i.e.,
hiding the real), repackaging (i.e., creating the false), and
dazzling (i.e., confusing an attacker) [8, 19]. Examples of
the simulation deception include mimicking (i.e., imitating the
real), inventing (i.e., creating the false), and decoying (i.e.,
luring) [8, 19]. Based on our discussion above, we can find the
commonalities and differences between deception and MTD as
below.
2) Commonalities between MTD and Deception: Both ap-
proaches have the same goal to confuse attackers by increasing
their uncertainty in the decision process of launching attacks.
Hence, the deception techniques used for increasing confusion
can also belong to MTD. In addition, even if the deception
techniques are used to mislead attackers but they are also being
dynamically deployed (i.e., a different set of decoy nodes is
deployed at a different time [52]), they can be treated as MTD
techniques.
3) Differences between MTD and Deception: Although
these two defense techniques are common in their goal,
deception takes a more aggressive strategy than MTD in terms
of intentionally presenting false information for the attacker
to form false beliefs while MTD does not use a strategy of
lying or disseminating false information to mislead attackers.
But these two defense mechanisms can work together well to
benefit each other in the following sense. Deploying deception
can be less costly than MTD operations and can help MTD to
save its cost because the attack can be delayed if an attacker
is successfully deceived by the deployed defensive deception
and accordingly MTD does not have to be triggered as often
as the system without deception [30]. In addition, the defense
strength achievable by defensive deception is limited in nature
because the deception can be ultimately known to the attacker
sometime later. When the attacker found it was deceived by the
defensive deception, the system can trigger an MTD operation
to protect the system without security breach.
D. Discussions on MTD Classifications
While the timeliness-based MTD categorizes MTD tech-
niques based on the principle of ‘when to move,’ the operation-
based MTD classifies MTD techniques by answering ‘how to
move.’ In the timeliness-based MTD, when a defender has
high uncertainty about an attacker’s current activities and/or
behaviors, it is better to trigger an MTD operation based on
a certain, fixed time interval. However, after the defender
9becomes certain about the attack patterns / activities, it can
detect the system’s vulnerabilities more accurately. And then,
the defender can adaptively execute the MTD operation to
save defense cost by using an event-based MTD, for example,
triggering an MTD operation based on intrusion alerts.
In the operation-based MTD classification, a single SDR
type can be used in an MTD technique or multiple types
can be used as we discussed in Section IV-D. Although a
hybrid approach may achieve more enhanced system security,
it may introduce additional defense cost and/or issues related
to service availability. Again, identifying a critical tradeoff
point between multiple, conflicting system goals is a non-
trivial task in developing a cost-effective and efficient MTD
solution.
These two classification methods answer two different de-
sign questions in developing MTD techniques (i.e., how -to-
move and when-to-move). Hence, we can even consider both
operation-based and timeliness-based classification in order to
develop a secure, affordable, adaptive, and QoS-aware MTD
solutions.
IV. MTD TECHNIQUES BASED ON SHUFFLING,
DIVERSITY, AND REDUNDANCY
In this section, we survey MTD techniques based on the
operation-based MTD classification with the three categories,
including shuffling, diversity, and redundancy. In addition,
since some approaches take hybrid approaches combining
more than one MTD technique, we categorize these as ‘hybrid’
in this paper. When some deception techniques are used to
change the attack surface, we also discuss them as MTD
techniques based on the used classification criteria.
A. Shuffling
A shuffling technique rearranges or randomizes system
configurations. In this section, we discuss various ways to
change the system or network configurations.
1) IP Shuffling / Mutations / Host Randomization: Many
shuffling-based MTD techniques used IP shuffling or mutation
in various network domains. Sharma et al. [138] developed
IP shuffling MTD by using the concept of IP multiplexing
(or demultiplexing) in an SDN environment. MacFarland and
Shue [100] used a host IP address mutation to defend a
large-scale network by employing an SDN controller that
controls DNS interactions. Antonatos et al. [10] proposed an
IP randomization technique to thwart hitlist worms attacks,
aiming to avoid malicious worms that gather information about
victim targets in a networked system and making it hard for
attackers to identify new, vulnerable targets. Jafarian et al.
[79] implemented an IP shuffling technique mutating the IP
addresses unpredictably while minimizing the overhead of the
MTD operations. The authors used the SDN-based OpenFlow
(OF) protocol that frequently assigns Virtual IP addresses
translated from and/or to a real host’s IP address.
Carroll et al. [23] also studied network address shuffling to
protect honeypots as an MTD technique based on probability
models to quantify the attack success probability with respect
to the size of a network, the number of addresses scanned
by attackers, the number of system vulnerabilities, and the
frequency of triggering the shuffling-based MTD. Kampanakis
et al. [85] employed host randomization and mutation, eval-
uating the performance in terms of the attackers’ overhead
increased by the MTD technique used in an SDN platform.
2) Port Hopping: Luo et al. [98] studied a port hopping
technique based on the concept of shuffling-based MTD to
effectively deal with reconnaissance attacks by hiding service
identities while increasing confusion for potential attackers.
This work quantifies the effectiveness of the proposed port
hopping technique based on the attack success probability as
a function of the values of key design parameters, including
the size of a port pool, the number of probes, the number of
vulnerable services, and the frequency of port hopping.
3) Packet Header Randomization: Wang et al. [156] pro-
posed a technique called U-TRI, Unlinkability Through Ran-
dom Identifier, which uses the randomization of a packet
header identifier to confuse attackers.
4) Network Topology Shuffling: The underlying idea of this
technique is to invalidate an attacker’s path information by
continuously changing routes in networks. Achleitner et al.
[1, 2] proposed a virtual topology generation framework
against network scanning attacks by leveraging the SDN
technology. Hong et al. [68] presented an optimal network
reconfiguration technique based on the concept of shuffling-
based MTD for SDN environments. They solved a shuffling
assignment problem and showed the increase in network
security when network routing paths are diversified.
5) VM / Proxy Migration: Danev et al. [41] considered
securely migrating Virtual Machines (VMs) as an MTD mech-
anism in a private cloud. The underlying idea of this work is
to utilize an extra physical Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
and trusted parties for the migration process as well as public
key infrastructure to secure the protocol. Zhang et al. [165]
developed a periodic VM migration as an MTD technique
based on the balance between the level of security obtained
and the cost incurred upon the migration of VMs.
Penner and Guirguis [121] developed a set of MTD tech-
nologies to change the location of VMs in a cloud to defend
against attacks leveraging a Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB) pol-
icy, which aims to exploit VMs providing the highest reward.
The proposed MTD techniques are deployed to minimize
the MAB attacks launched by the attacker aiming to obtain
credentials (e.g., credit card information) or critical data.
The proposed MTD techniques are evaluated based on how
much time it takes to switch VMs. However, the enhanced
security introduced by the MTD techniques has not been
investigated. Jia et al. [83] devised an MTD technique to deal
with Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks through
securing data transmission between authenticated (legitimate)
clients and a protected server. This method used the technique
called client-to-proxy shuffling that continuously moves secret
proxies. For evaluation, they assessed the resistance of their
method toward brute-force attacks, as well as proxy-based and
communication-based overhead.
Peng et al. [120] proposed VM migration or snapshotting
and diversity or compatibility of migration for cloud networks.
This work considered attackers’ learning based on accumu-
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lated intelligence obtained and dynamics and heterogeneity
of a service’s attack surface. Finally, this work proposed a
probability model to propose an MTD service deployment
strategy. This study found that the proposed MTD technique
is more effective under a dense service deployment and strong
attacks while the defender’s awareness toward the heterogene-
ity and dynamics of the attack surface is helpful for enhancing
the effectiveness of the MTD as it can be used to determine
when/how to perform the MTD.
6) Software / Service Reconfiguration: Casola et al. [26]
developed an MTD technique based on the reconfiguration
of devices in an IoT environment whose cryptosystems and
firmware versions are shuffled. Vikram et al. [154] proposed a
shuffling based MTD technique on the application layer for a
secure web through randomizing HTML elements. Most bots
attacking the web use static HTML elements in the HTTP
content/form page. Hence, the randomization of those HTML
elements and parameters could be an appropriate technique for
avoiding web bot attacks.
7) Platform Diversity: Okhravi et al. [114] proposed the
Trusted Dynamic Logical Heterogeneity System (TALENT)
framework for live-migrating of the critical infrastructure
applications across heterogeneous platforms, which permits
running of the critical applications to change its hardware
and operating system (OS). It changes a platform on-the-
fly, creates a cyber moving target, and provides the cyber
survivability through platform diversity. TALENT creates a
virtualized environment at the OS-level using containers with
a checkpoint compiler for migrating a running application of
different platforms. It preserves the state of the application,
such as the execution state, the open files, and the network
connections during the migration.
8) OS-Rotation:: Thompson et al. [148] developed the
Multiple OS Rotational Environment (MORE) MTD based on
the existing technology to achieve a feasible MTD solution
at an OS-level. MORE MTD consists of a set of virtual
machines (VMs) equipped with a different distribution of
OS (i.e., different Linux distributions) and web applications.
The periodic rotation of the hosts/VMs creates the dynamic
environment controlled by an administrator’s machine running
a daemon process. This technique reduces the likelihood
of a successful exploitation of the OS’s vulnerabilities and
its security impact by limiting the duration of the rotation
window. The “rotation window” is the duration of an OS being
exposed and vulnerable to an attack.
Pros and Cons: Shuffling-based MTD techniques can easily
work with existing technologies without developing another
security mechanism that requires a thorough security analysis.
Hence, in terms of the development cost and resources, these
methods are useful, immediately applicable, and highly com-
patible with legacy devices and technologies. However, since
shuffling relies on the quality of existing technologies, if those
existing technologies are not robust enough against attacks
(i.e., well-known vulnerabilities to attackers), the security
achieved by this shuffling technique can be significantly lim-
ited by those vulnerabilities of the legacy devices/technologies.
In this case, the shuffling frequency can be increased to help
cover those vulnerabilities, but this also will increase the
defense cost incurred by over-utilizing MTD as another layer
of defense. Furthermore, the shuffling spaces (e.g., a number
of virtual IPs that can be assigned for a real IP) are critical to
enhancing security.
B. Diversity
Diversity-based MTD techniques employ the deployment
of system components with different implementations. In this
section, we discuss how system diversity is realized based on
a variety of domains.
1) Software Stack Diversity: Huang and Ghosh [72] and
Huang et al. [73] introduced a diversity MTD technique in or-
der to enhance network resilience and service provisions. They
deployed a diversity method to the virtual servers (VS) like
OSs, virtualization components, web servers, and application
software. They evaluated the proposed diversity method with
respect to attack success probability.
2) Code Diversity: Azab et al. [15] developed an MTD
technique that changes a running program’s variants erratically
based on the concept of diversity. The proposed method
divides a large program into components (e.g., cells or tasks)
that can be performed by functionally-equivalent variants.
Their method includes a recovery mechanism to enhance the
resilience of the proposed technique. Choosing a different
variant at runtime makes it hard for an attacker to penetrate
into and scan the system. The proposed method can mitigate
even the effect of the attack success by affecting one variant
that can be instantly replaced by another variant through the
recovery mechanism. However, the robustness against attacks
based on security analysis is not clear while its implementation
is quite complex which can be questioned for applicability in
diverse contexts.
In automated software diversity, a program can diversify
at instruction, block, loop, program and system levels in
different phases of the life cycle, such as compilation and
linking, or installation [92]. A JIT (just-in-time) compiler
(i.e., Java/Python JIT compilers) generates code during the
execution of the program. The JIT compilers can be used
for the code diversification. In this case, the security of the
system depends on how predictable the JIT compilers are.
The code diversity can be enhanced with adaptive notification-
oriented programming (i.e., assembly language instruction, no-
op) [81].
3) Programming Language Diversity: Taguinod et al. [146]
focused on an MTD technique based on the diversification
of programming languages to avoid code and SQL injection
attacks. This work proposed the MTD technique to be applied
in different layers of the web application to change the
implemented language of the web application without affecting
or disrupting the system functionality.
4) Network Diversity: Zhuang et al. [170] investigated
the relationship between the diversity of network configura-
tions and attack success probability by evaluating the MTD
technique based on a logical mission model. The authors
examined how the network size, the frequency of shuffling /
adaptations, and the number of vulnerable computers affect the
effectiveness of the MTD technique based on the experimental
results tested from the network security simulator, NeSSi2.
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TABLE IV
A SUMMARY OF PROS AND CONS OF MTD TECHNIQUES
Type Main Techniques Pros Cons Ref.
Shuffling IP shuffling, mutations; host
randomization packet header
randomization; network topology
shuffling; VM / proxy migration;
software / service reconfiguration
Leveraging legacy devices or
technologies; providing affordable,
economical defense
Potential high cost or service
interruptions if not executed
adaptively; limited by the inherent
vulnerabilities of the existing
technologies used or shuffling
spaces
[1, 2, 10, 23, 26, 41,
68, 79, 83, 85, 98,
100, 120, 121, 138,
154, 156, 165]
Diversity Software stack diversity; code
diversity; programming language
diversity; network diversity
Leveraging legacy devices or
technologies; working well with
shuffling-based MTD to double
the effect
Limited by the inherent
vulnerabilities of the existing
technologies or a number of
software alternatives
[15, 72, 73, 146, 170]
Redundancy Redundancy of software components;
redundancy of network sessions
High reliability/availability
achievable; easily combined with
shuffling or diversity to
significantly secure a system and
ensure service availability
Additional cost to move / setup
additional system components
(e.g., servers or routing paths); if
not properly executed, it increases
attack surface.
[95, 159]
Hybrid Redundancy and diversity based MTD
to provide diverse replicas of web
services; shuffling and redundancy for
VM migration with multiple VM
replicas; combining shuffling,
redundancy, and diversity based MTD
for cloud-based web services
Providing enhanced security by
combining multiple MTD
techniques which a single solution
cannot introduce
Additional cost; high complexity
for multi-objective optimization
with multiple operational
decisions
[4, 5, 6, 59]
Pros and Cons: Similar to shuffling-based MTD, diversity-
based MTD can leverage the existing technologies. As dis-
cussed earlier, diversity-based MTD techniques are often com-
bined with shuffling-based counterparts to double the effective-
ness of a proposed MTD. However, since the diversity-based
MTD is also based on the existing technologies, if those tech-
nologies have high vulnerabilities to attacks, introducing MTD
as another layer of defense does not provide better security,
even with the sacrifice of additional defense cost. In addition,
the degree of diversity significantly affects the effectiveness
of the MTD. For example, if there are not many alternatives
to use (e.g., only two versions of software that provides the
same functionality with different implementations), there will
be inherent limitations in enhancing the security.
C. Redundancy
Redundancy techniques provide multiple replicas of system
or network components providing the same functionality at
the network/application layer. In this section, we discuss how
these techniques are studied in the existing approaches.
1) Redundancy of Software Components: Yuan et al. [159]
proposed a redundancy method for web servers to prevent ma-
licious code injection attacks on a web server by developing a
self-protection model, including architectural adaptation threat
detection and mitigation. They used the so-called agreement-
based redundancy that provides replicas of software compo-
nents at runtime. However, this work did not investigate the
effectiveness of the proposed MTD mechanism.
2) Redundancy of Network Sessions: Li et al. [95] proposed
a traffic morphing mechanism by adopting the concept of
MTD in terms of redundancy for cyber-physical system (CPS)
environments. The proposed traffic morphing algorithm is
designed to protect CPS sessions by maintaining a number
of redundant network sessions which have the distributions of
inter-packet delays indistinguishable from those observed in
normal network sessions. A CPS message will be disseminated
via one of these sessions to meet its given time constraint. In
the process of dynamically adjusting the morphing process,
this work showed the low complexity of the proposed work
and high adaptivity to the dynamics of CPS sessions.
Pros and Cons: Unlike shuffling or diversity based MTD,
redundancy-based MTD has a greater bearing on service
availability to users, which is often measured by some concept
of system dependability (e.g., availability or reliability) in
which the availability (or reliability) can be easily interrupted
by performing shuffling or diversity based MTD, particularly
incurring interrupted services. Note that redundancy-based
MTD can be well-mingled with the other two techniques
with the aim of increasing both security and performance.
However, creating additional replicas of system components
(e.g., servers or paths) incurs an extra cost. In addition, if
redundancy-based MTD is not properly executed, it provides
an even greater chance for an attacker to perform attacks on a
larger attack surface (i.e., another server to attack or another
path to reach a target) than the system without the redundancy-
based MTD.
D. Hybrid
Hybrid MTD combines multiple MTD techniques among
the types (i.e., shuffling, diversity, and redundancy) to work in
cooperation. In this section, we discuss how MTD techniques
can be integrated to enhance system security and performance.
1) Diversity + Redundancy (D+R): Gorbenko et al. [59]
developed a web service based on the concept of redundancy
and diversity by providing diverse replicas of web services for
maximizing system dependability, which is assessed by avail-
ability, reliability, and/or service response time. However, this
work does not conduct an in-depth investigation of security
analysis.
2) Shuffling + Redundancy (S+R): Alavizadeh et al. [4]
combined shuffling with redundancy by developing shuffling-
based VM Live-Migration (VM-LM) and generating VM repli-
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cas to enhance both security and dependability of a system.
The authors assessed the performance of the developed MTD
technique based on the metrics of System Risk (Risk) and
Reliability (R) to show how effective the combined MTD
technique is in a cloud environment. Similarly, Alavizadeh
et al. [6] conducted a substantial analysis to evaluate the
effectiveness of two other combinations of MTD techniques
through considering three key metrics, including Risk (Risk),
Attack Cost (AC), and Return on Attack (RoA). Based
on their definition, an appropriate MTD technique should
decrease Risk and RoA while increasing AC. The authors
showed that combining shuffling and diversity can optimally
meet these multiple objectives, whereas a single solution with
either shuffling or diversity cannot.
3) Shuffling + Diversity + Redundancy (S+D+R): Alav-
izadeh et al. [5] combined the three MTD techniques (i.e.,
S+D+R) in the virtualization layer of a cloud, in order to
quantify the cloud’s security level through comprehensive
security analysis. Similar to [6], the authors investigated the
performance of the combined MTD techniques based on
formal graphical security models for the cloud environment
using the three metrics (i.e., Risk, RoA, and AC) plus system
availability (SA).
Pros and Cons: Hybrid MTD approaches based on more
than one MTD technique can introduce additional benefits of
enhancing security, which may not possible under a single
technique based MTD solution. In particular, diversity or
redundancy combined with shuffling can significantly increase
security while decreasing defense cost or service interruptions.
For example, MTD combining shuffling with diversity may not
require shuffling as frequent as an MTD with a shuffling only
solution because the diversity of system components can make
it harder for attackers to figure out their vulnerabilities. In
addition, redundancy can increase system availability leading
to high service quality provided to users with fewer interrup-
tions. However, as discussed earlier, it may introduce a larger
attack surface than a single MTD. It also requires additional
overhead and/or complexity in combining multiple techniques
as a single solution and encounters a complex, multi-objective
optimization problem with multiple operational constraints,
which is known to be an NP-hard problem [29].
E. Discussions on Operation-based MTD Techniques
From our literature review on MTD techniques based on the
three MTD classes (shuffling, diversity, and redundancy), we
observed the following:
• A large volume of shuffling-based MTD techniques:
Many shuffling-based MTD techniques, such as platform
migration or network topology changing, are combined with
diversity-based techniques so that their positive effect is
maximized to enhance security. However, critical tradeoffs
between security (e.g., security vulnerabilities reduced) and
performance (e.g., defense cost or service availability) have
not been thoroughly investigated.
• The improvement of security bounded by the vulner-
abilities of existing technologies leveraged by MTD:
Due to the nature of MTD leveraging existing technologies,
there is an inherent limitation in achieving security if the
existing technologies do not have a sufficient level of
security robustness. For example, the vulnerabilities in the
leveraged technologies (e.g., software vulnerabilities) cannot
be removed even if a diverse software stack is used.
• Redundancy-based MTD combined with other tech-
niques to ensure service availability: We noticed that
the redundancy-based MTD does not play a significant
role as proactive MTD defense compared to the other
two techniques. Rather, redundancy-based MTD is used
to enhance service availability (or reliability), which can
be easily excluded when shuffling/diversity techniques are
solely used without consideration of the critical tradeoff
between enhanced security and defense cost introduced.
• Highly promising hybrid MTD with further investigation
to optimize its deployment: Hybrid MTD approaches are
very promising because they can achieve multiple objec-
tives of maximizing security with minimum defense cost
or maximum service availability when they are properly
implemented. However, additional overhead or complex-
ity introduced by combining multiple techniques is not
avoidable and it is necessary to conduct a very careful
examination about a hybrid MTD before it is deployed.
We summarize the key techniques under each class (i.e.,
shuffling, diversity, redundancy, or hybrid) of MTD techniques
and their pros and cons in Table IV.
V. KEY ATTACKS MITIGATED BY MTD AND LIMITATIONS
OF ATTACK MODELING IN MTD
In this section, we discuss the characteristics of attacks con-
sidered in the state-of-the-art MTD techniques. To be specific,
we discuss: (1) the characteristics of advanced attacks; (2) the
cyber kill chain model; (3) attack types mainly considered
in the existing MTD approaches; and (4) limitations of the
existing threat models.
A. Characteristics of Advanced Attacks
MTD techniques have been developed in order to deal
with increasingly more sophisticated, intelligent, and persistent
attacks equipped with more advanced tools. We discuss the key
characteristics of these advanced attackers as follows:
• Persistent attackers: In the existing MTD works, we found
that attackers are persistent, not performing an one-time
attack (e.g., APT attacks [20, 43, 46, 71]). This persistent
attack behavior is well observed in multi-stage attacks that
start from scanning attacks in the reconnaissance stage prior
to attacks obtaining access into a system (i.e., outside attack-
ers) and continue to the attack delivery and/or exploitation
stage after they break into the system (i.e., inside attackers).
• Adaptive attackers: Attackers are adaptive to dynamically
changing system conditions and external environmental
conditions, as they take into consideration both physical
and cyber accessibility. These attackers also have intelli-
gence with regard to their resources, executing adaptive at-
tacks [82, 155, 158] that wisely manage their resource limits
and at the same time opportunistically seek to compromise
an entire system.
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• Stealthy attackers: Attackers do not exhibit an identifiable
attacking behavior all the time. They perform attacks in a
highly stealthy manner [3, 79], even showing well-behaved
features of good citizens. However, at a time when an attack
is calculated to inflict serious harm or damage to the system,
they exhibit attack behaviors. But they stay stealthy until the
time comes.
• Incentive-driven attackers: MTD is developed to deal
with smart attackers. In particular, attackers are intelligent
enough to execute attacks efficiently, such that the attack
has a minimal cost but maximal outcome. Therefore, we can
consider the attacker to be a rational actor that is sensitive to
incentives, such as attack success with minimum cost [49].
As a typical type of sophisticated attacks, the Advanced
Persistent Threat (APT) has been commonly considered as
an attack type techniques need to countermeasure [20, 43, 46,
71, 125, 168]. More or less, APT attackers show the above
features in performing their attacks and are often described
under the scenario of the Cyber Kill Chains [74]. In the next
section, we discuss an overview of the cyber kill chain and
the behavior of an APT attack at each stage of the chain so
as to understand how MTD techniques needs to consider APT
attacks.
B. Cyber Kill Chain
A new class of adversaries with sufficient resources and
high intelligence has emerged, which is the so-called ‘Ad-
vanced Persistent Threat (APT),’ as mentioned in Section V-A.
APT is capable of multi-year intrusion campaigns to obtain
highly sensitive information, such as corporate proprietary
information or national security secrets [74]. In order to defend
against APTs, an intelligence-based defense model is critical
to defenders for mitigating risk and/or vulnerability of attacks
to a system. Hutchins et al. [74] developed the intelligence-
based defense model, called the Cyber Kill Chain (CKC),
based on multiple phases of a cyber attack. The CKC model
provides: (1) the description of intrusion phases; (2) mapping
the indicators of adversary kill chain to the courses of defense
actions; (3) the pattern identification associating individual
intrusions with broader campaigns; and (4) the understanding
of iterative intelligence gathering.
The CKC model consists of the following phases [74]:
1) Reconnaissance: This phase involves researching, iden-
tifying, or selecting targets, often by crawling Internet
websites to obtain target information, such as email
addresses, social relationships, or information regarding
particular technologies the target system uses.
2) Weaponization: This phase uses a remote access trojan
to be coupled with an exploit into a deliverable payload
(e.g., Adobe Portable Document Format or Microsoft
Office documents) using an automated tool, called a
weaponizer.
3) Delivery: In this phase, the weapon is transmitted to a
targeted system using delivery vectors for weaponized
payload by APT actors (e.g., email attachments, website,
and/or USB removable media).
4) Exploitation: After the delivery of the weapon to a victim
host, the intruders’ code is triggered by exploitation, com-
monly targeting for an application or OS vulnerabilities.
5) Installation: The adversary can stay inside the target envi-
ronment by installing a remote access trojan or backdoor
on the target (or victim) system.
6) Command & Control (C2): Compromised hosts try to
establish a C2 channel by beaconing outbound to an
Internet controller server. Upon the establishment of the
C2 channel, the intruders can take control of the target
system (e.g., ‘hands on the keyboard’).
7) Actions on Objectives: After the previous six phases
are successfully performed, adversaries launch attacks
to breach security goals (e.g., data integrity, availability,
confidentiality).
MIT Lincoln lab used a shorter version of the CKC model with
the phases of reconnaissance, access, exploit development,
attack launch, and persistence [113, 157]. In this MIT Lincoln
Lab version, the ‘access’ phase incorporates the ‘weaponiza-
tion’ and ’delivery’ phases from [74] and the ‘attack launch’
phase incorporates ‘installation’ and ‘C2’ [74] as well.
Limitations of Considering APT attacks: Existing MTD
approaches heavily consider attackers in the stage of recon-
naissance when the attackers are outside attackers. However,
in many cases, stealthy, undetected inside attackers are more
serious threats to the system when they are not properly
handled, such as detecting them by an IDS. But considering
a high volume of false detection, MTD can significantly help
intrusion detection by adding another layer of defense against
the inside attackers.
C. Attack Types
In this section, we discuss more concrete examples of attack
behaviors considered in the existing MTD approaches.
• Reconnaissance (or scanning) attacks: Scanning attacks
are used by attackers to gather information and intelligence
about a target system before an actual attack is launched.
The attackers usually use a customized set of software tools
(e.g., Nmap [99]) to scan the target system (or network)
to find information, such as OS types, IP addresses, port
numbers, running services, protocols, network topology, and
exploitable vulnerabilities. An attacker/scanner performs
scanning by sending probe packets (e.g., ICMP echo request
message or TCP SYN, TCP ACK, TCP Xmas, UDP port
scanning, etc.) to the target host(s) in the networks. To
counter reconnaissance attacks, several network address-
based approaches have been proposed [1, 3, 23, 44, 79, 88,
97, 138].
• DoS (or DDoS) attacks: A DDoS attack uses a large num-
ber of botnets (i.e., a set of bots, consisting of compromised
machines, or zombie machines) to attack a targeted system
by flooding traffic messages (e.g., UDP floods, ICMP floods,
and/or SYN floods) from multiple sources to force it to shut
down or to deny services to legitimate users. DDoS often
involve time-based attacks that can cause targeted systems
to miss critical deadlines for updates or to fail to complete
critical tasks. Common MTD approaches to handle these
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Fig. 5. Different Attacks considered by shuffling, diversity, or redundancy-based MTD approaches.
attacks include the use of hidden proxies, IP/port shuffling
and/or address mapping [13, 34, 51, 61, 82, 83, 88, 93, 142,
145, 158, 105]. For example, Meier et al. [105] proposed
a novel network obfuscation approach and implemented a
framework named ‘NetHide’ which can successfully battle
against the possible attacks such as Link-Flooding Attacks
(LFAs) launched by even advanced attackers. The MTD
strategy behind the NetHide is to change and modify path
tracing probes in the data plan. They showed that NetHide
can hold a trade-off between security (i.e., creating dif-
ficulties for attackers) and usability (e.g., high accuracy
and low network functionality degradation). Their results
showed that NetHide can mitigate the probability of attack
success by 1% while it provides 90% and 72% accuracy
and utility, respectively. Moreover, MOTAG [83] mitigates
the flooding DDoS attacks using hidden proxies as moving
targets to secure service access for authenticated clients.
• Buffer overflow attacks: This kind of attack usually hap-
pens due to a lack of buffer boundary checking. Common
memory protection techniques, such as Address Space-
Layout Randomization (ASLR) [135], and Address Space
Layout Permutation (ASLP) [89], are proposed to thwart
the buffer overflow attack. These techniques randomize the
memory position of data and program segment, library,
and so forth. Manadhata [103] and Manadhata and Wing
[102] also considered a buffer overflow, leveraging the attack
surface of a defense system and proposed a countermeasure
against it by reducing or shifting the attack surface in terms
of the system’s methods, channels, and/or data items.
• Worm attacks: A worm is a malicious software (malware)
that replicates itself and employs a network to spread itself
to other machines by relying on existing bugs or holes
in the target system. The worms cause damages, such as
consuming bandwidth or turning a worm-infected computer
into a botnet that can be used by the worm’s programmer
to profit by sending spam or conducting DDoS attacks. A
countermeasure against worm attacks is Network Address
Space Randomization (NASR) [3, 10, 80] that randomizes
the host IP address (i.e., IP shuffling).
• APT attacks: APT attacks are well known as one of
the sophisticated attack types aiming to access system
resources, control them, and perform exfiltration attacks
(e.g., leaking sensitive or confidential information out to
unauthorized parties) by performing stealthy, persistent, and
adaptive attacks [1, 9, 24, 25, 30, 49]. The behaviors of
APT attackers can be observed in the cyber kill chain,
which is described in Section V-B. APT attacks are also
called ‘multi-stage attacks’ that refer to attackers performing
multiple attacks across multiple stages. For example, the
attacks range from network scanning and packet sniffing
to illegitimate authentication and service interruption (e.g.,
Stuxnet virus) [20, 43, 46, 125, 168].
• Side channel attacks on VMs: Attackers perform attacks
over side channels based on the shared CPU cache of a VM
in order to obtain sensitive information [165].
• Attacks on Web applications: Diverse types of attacks can
be performed on web applications, such as SQL injection,
directory traversal, and cross site scripting which breach the
key security goals that are confidentiality, integrity, and/or
availability. These types of attacks can be countermeasured
by software stack diversity and/or redundancy [109, 132,
159].
We summarized the main attack types considered in existing
MTD approaches with 36 papers published for 2010-2018 in
Fig. 5. Note that more than one technique or attack can be
considered in each work. The three major attacks the existing
MTD techniques have mainly addressed are reconnaissance
attacks, DoS attacks, and APT attacks. In addition, most
proposed approaches are shuffling-based MTD while diversity-
based MTD techniques are often combined with the shuffling-
based techniques. But redundancy-based techniques are rarely
discussed to deal with the attack behaviors addressed above
because the redundancy-based approaches have been studied in
the dependability domain (e.g., reliability, availability) rather
than for the purpose of MTD and often used in combi-
nation with either shuffling-based or diversity-based MTD
techniques.
D. Limitations of the Current Attack Models
From the survey of attack types considered by existing MTD
approaches, we can identify the following limitations in the
current attack models:
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TABLE V
KEY MODELING AND SOLUTION TECHNIQUES OF MTD AND THEIR PROS AND CONS.
Approach Technique Pros Cons Ref.
Game Theoretic
(GT) MTD
General Game
Theoretic Approach
Capability to effectively model
interactions between players;
identifying optimal solution under
complex interactions between
multiple parties
Issues associated with players’
bounded rationality (or irrationality)
and/or misperception; high solution
complexity;
[24, 25, 36, 51, 83, 109,
158, 168]
Bayesian Stackelberg
Game
[34, 49, 117, 118, 132,
165, 169]
Stochastic Game [103, 137]
Genetic
Algorithm
(GA)-based
MTD
General GA
Fast method to find good solutions;
providing good understanding of
how good a given solution is
based on a fitness function;
Scalability problem in a large
number of generators; it may not
find the optimal solution;
uncertainty to find fitness
[38, 40, 84, 172]
Machine Learning
(ML)-based MTD
General ML Capturing an evolving attacker;
high scalability and applicability
Needing a large amount of data for
training and modeling
[154]
Classification-based [35, 36]
Reinforcement learning [149, 167]
• Smart, intelligent attackers are significantly less con-
sidered. Most MTD techniques are shuffling-based to deal
with attacks. If attackers are intelligent such that they are
able to detect defense patterns by using learning mechanisms
(e.g., machine learning or cognitive learning), then they can
easily capture what types of MTD techniques are used and
what the patterns are to trigger an MTD operation. However,
highly intelligent, learning attackers are not really consid-
ered. Generally, it is assumed that attackers have certain
attack patterns, rather than that they learn and can launch
adaptive attacks. Whereas the contrary is true for defenders;
they are often permitted to take proactive, adaptive defense
actions based on an assumed highly intelligent learning ca-
pability. This assumption may not be true; even the attackers
are often smarter than the defenders in practice [75].
• Few scenarios are considered to deal with multiple
strategies by attackers and defenders. A specific attack
type can be easily mitigated or prevented by a particular
MTD technique. However, if an attacker identifies an exploit
that is not covered by the deployed MTD technique, the
attacker can even use the exploit and successfully launch
its attack to penetrate into the system. Unfortunately, most
MTD approaches focus on a single or a small set of attacks,
and few scenarios have considered multiple strategies that
can be taken by attackers or defenders. For example, the
attacker may need to decide which system vulnerability it
needs to target while the defender may want to determine
which defense mechanism needs to be used, where both par-
ties aim to choose a cost-effective decision under resource-
constrained, time-sensitive settings.
• An attacker has been less considered as a rational
decision maker with learning ability. The smart attackers
can leverage how MTD works and what side-effect the MTD
can introduce. In addition, they can capture the defense
patterns for an adaptive MTD which aims to realize a cost-
effective MTD. However, attackers with learning capability
and their mental models have been rarely studied while high
intelligence with the defender and corresponding intelligent
MTD (e.g., machine learning-based MTD) is easily assumed
and has been proposed [36, 149, 154, 167].
VI. MODELING AND SOLUTION TECHNIQUES OF MTD
MTD techniques have been proposed by using various types
of modeling and solution techniques. In this work, we discuss
key modeling and solution techniques of MTD based on the
following theoretical approaches: (1) game theory; (2) genetic
algorithms; and (3) machine learning.
A. Game Theory-based MTD
The fundamental mechanism behind MTD techniques is to
add another layer of defense by manipulating the attack surface
that aims to increase the level of protection provided to a
system while incurring additional cost (i.e., reconfiguration
cost) and causing potential service unavailability to normal
users. In this context, the clear concepts of gain and loss make
the use of game theoretic approaches highly relevant to design
and analyze cyberdefense as a game between an attacker and
defender. Game theory can appropriately model decisions and
actions by the defender and attacker, where they are assumed
rational and aim to seek optimal strategies to maximize their
utilities. Hence, in terms of the defender’s perspective, the key
goal of an MTD strategy is to identify a set of optimal system
configuration policies in order to shift the attack surface, which
can minimize risk and/or damage introduced by an action
by the attacker [168]. On the other hand, the attacker aims
to successfully launch its attack with minimum effort / time
and maximum effectiveness in achieving its objectives. Hence,
a two-player game well models the competition scenario
between the attacker and the MTD-based defender.
In this section, we discuss common game theoretic ap-
proaches used to develop MTD techniques, including a general
game theoretic approach (i.e., not based on a specific game),
a Bayesian Stackelberg Game, and a stochastic game. In
addition, we discuss the cons and pros when game theory
inspires the development of MTD techniques.
1) General Game Theoretic Approaches: Many MTD tech-
niques have been developed using a general game framework
where an attacker and defender are assumed to be rational
and aim to maximize their respective utility. Although no
specific game theory is mentioned, if authors say they take a
game theoretic approach for their MTD by using the concept
of payoff (or utility) based on estimated gain and loss in
choosing the best strategy, in response to an action taken by
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its respective opponent, we categorized it as a game theoretic
MTD approach.
Zhu and Bas¸ar [168] investigated a tradeoff between security
and usability based on the security enhanced by the MTD
and the performance degraded by the MTD, such as service
unavailability or system reconfiguration cost. The authors
modeled a game between an attacker and defender where
the defender aims to minimize risk and maintain service
availability while the attacker dynamically exploits vulnera-
bilities of system components with the goal of introducing a
maximum damage on the system. The defender performs MTD
by continuously changing their defensive strategies based
on dynamically learned information in a highly uncertain
environment. Ge et al. [51] provided an incentive-compatible
MTD technique based on server location migrations and a
user-server mapping mechanism to enhance resilience and
agility of a system along with high network timeliness and
throughput. Carter et al. [24, 25] used a game theory to
derive an optimal migration strategy. Those works analyzed
temporal platform migration patterns and identified an optimal
strategy for selecting the next platform. This demonstrates the
following: (1) although platform diversity is effective against
some persistent attacks, it may have a negative impact on
the ability to defend against fast and local attacks [24]; (2)
increasing diversity in platform selection is more effective
than randomization; and (3) ensuring high diversity between
available platforms has a stronger impact on security than
having a large number of available platforms.
In contrast, Colbaugh and Glass [36] found that uniform
randomization is an optimal strategy for diversity-based MTD.
The differences between optimal strategies can be explained
by the attack model each study used and more specifically
whether the attacker’s goal required a persistent foothold in
the system. Neti et al. [109] used an anti-coordination game
to capture the interplay of choice, diversity, and scalability of
risk in software-defined networking (SDN)-based MTD. This
study evaluated a scenario where one node in a network is
compromised while the rest of the nodes use a game theoretic
approach to decide whether to switch or not per distinct
platform. Jia et al. [83] proposed an approach to counteract
DDoS attacks where the approach uses a pool of redundant
proxies between the clients and the web application. To evalu-
ate this concept, Wright et al. [158] conducted a game theoretic
analysis where two players try to influence the quality of
service experienced by users of a web application, at a minimal
cost. Their investigation demonstrated how the effectiveness
of mitigating DDoS strategies changes depending on various
conditions (e.g., migration cost, a number of attacker bots,
and/or information provided by an insider).
2) Bayesian Stackelberg Game: Bayesian Stackelberg
games [117, 118] have been used in modeling an attack-
defense game to solve various cybersecurity problems. In
a Stackelberg game, there are two players, a leader and a
follower where the leader takes an action first and then the
follower takes its action by investigating the impact of the
leader’s action to its payoff. Hence, the follower aims to
optimize the payoff of its action based on the leader’s action.
Hence, in this context, what action to take by the leader is
critical to leading the follower’s action. The Stackelberg game
has been popularly used in modeling interactions between an
attacker and defender in a system with MTD techniques as
explained below.
Hasan and Rahman [64] proposed a game theoretic model
using Nash equilibrium named Co-resident Attacks Mitiga-
tion and Prevention (CAMP) to detect co-resident attack
and mitigate the malicious VM co-location in a co-resident
environment. Through simulation, they showed that their game
model can provide optimal defensive strategies for the VM
which can effectively fail the co-resident attack. Feng et al.
[49] investigated how the strategies of information disclosure
by defenders can improve the effectiveness of MTD techniques
based on Bayesian Stackelberg game theory. They designed
a signaling game based on the concept of the Bayesian
Persuasion Model to consider how a defender signals an
attacker and how the attacker responds to the signal in their
decision making process. Based on the analysis of the optimal
defense strategies in platform migration, this work shows
that strategic information disclosure is a promising method to
enhance defense effectiveness. Zhang et al. [165] proposed an
incentive-compatible MTD to identify an optimal interval of
VM migration in clouds. This work uses the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism to realize mechanism design by
considering the security benefit and the defense cost intro-
duced by the VM migration.
Some shuffling-based MTD techniques are used to imple-
ment defensive deception techniques. These types of tech-
niques can be called ‘MTD using deception.’ For example,
Clark et al. [34] used IP mutation to distract and/or mislead
attackers to fail to identify real nodes. This work places a
network of decoy nodes and identifies an optimal strategy
to mutate IP addresses of real nodes based on a Stack-
elberg game. Zhu et al. [169] proposed a deceptive flow-
based defense mechanism in a multi-path routing network by
generating fake packets aiming to lure attackers to expend
their energy disrupting fake packets. This work modeled the
interactions between an attacker and a defender based on a
Stackelberg game and derived solution equilibria based on an
iterative backward induction method.
Sengupta et al. [132] used a Bayesian Stackelberg game to
identify an effective switching strategy for web applications
to maximize security for a given set of system configurations
while minimizing the defender’s switching cost.
3) Stochastic Game: Stochastic game is developed by
Shapley [137] and it can reflect dynamics between multiple
players based on probabilistic transitions. The game consists
of multiple stages where each stage can start from some state.
Each player chooses its action and receives its respective
payoff based on the taken action and the current state. The
process is repeated as players arrive new states based on the
probabilistic transitions. Manadhata [103] proposed a two-
player stochastic game model to determine an optimal MTD
strategy based on attack surface diversification. The authors
explicitly modeled different attacker profiles (e.g., script kid-
dies, experienced hackers, organized criminals, and nation
states) and used the subgame perfect equilibrium concept to
determine the optimal defense strategy.
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Pros and Cons: Since game theoretic approaches have been
so commonly used in modeling the competitive interactions
between an attacker and defender in designing techniques for
MTD, we discuss several key advantages and disadvantages
of game theoretic MTD.
The advantages of game theoretic approaches are:
• Game theory offers an effective way to formulate interac-
tions between an attacker and defender. Game theory has
been well explored to model the decision making process
and how the best strategy is chosen by multiple players
who participate in the same game. Hence, there are many
existing, mature game theories to model different scenarios
of a cybergame by an attacker and defender. In particular,
game theoretic modeling techniques are highly effective to
model actions by each party based on historical interactions
between them.
• Game theory provides convenient tools to formulate
the decision utility of an attacker and defender. Most
cybergame scenarios consider a player’s multiple objectives.
For example, the attacker wants to maximize their attack
effectiveness (i.e., impact by the attack success) with the
minimum attack cost (e.g., time / resource to perform an
attack). In addition, the defender also chooses a defense
strategy to maximize defense strength for enhanced system
security while minimizing service interruptions to users and
defense cost. Both parties basically want to take an action
that provides the best outcome with minimum cost.
• Game theory can provide an optimal strategy based
on learning. We can easily embed each player’s learning
toward an opponent’s action into a game. In particular, in
a cyberwar game with the key players being an attacker
and defender, taking an adaptive strategy under a highly
dynamic, hostile environment is critical to achieving their
respective goal. Game theoretic approaches can provide
an effective way to consider each party’s learning and
accordingly their adaptive behavior to maximize their utility
under the dynamic, hostile settings.
The disadvantages of game theoretic MTD are:
• Attackers are not necessarily rational or intelligent.
Game theory assumes that all players are rational in order
to maximize their own utilities. However, in the context of
cybersecurity, attackers may not necessarily be rational or
intelligent. Instead, the volume of attackers can be substan-
tially large even if their intelligence is very low, aiming only
to waste resources of a system (or network) and decrease
the system resilience, leading to a sudden breakdown of
the system without recoverability. In addition, if incentives
based on rationality are not compatible (e.g., attackers are
not stimulated by the incentives), the best strategies derived
by the defender may not work for irrational attackers.
• Solution space may be too large, resulting in pro-
hibitively high solution complexity. A game theoretic
approach can provide a best strategy for a defender to
mitigate the impact by an attack. However, generating an
optimal strategy may not be light enough to be run particu-
larly on resource-constrained platforms. Greedy, heuristic
approaches usually sacrifice a certain level of optimality
while providing lightweight solutions.
• Players, an attacker and a defender, may have inherent
misperception impacting their decision making process.
As the assumption of complete information available to
players has been realized as unrealistic, game theoretic
approaches considering incomplete information have been
proposed [63] meaning that players do not have perfect
knowledge in deriving their accurate utilities. Nevertheless,
since incomplete information is applicable to all players in a
game, the view toward the game itself is assumed to be the
same, implying that each player play the same game based
on available information even if the information itself would
be incomplete. But in reality, each player may interpret
the same game differently based on its own subjective
perception. Hypergame theory [55] has been proposed to
deal with this kind of misperception and/or uncertainty
problem in game theory; but it has not been applied in
modeling interactions between an attacker and defender in
a system with MTD.
B. Genetic Algorithm-based MTD
Genetic algorithms (GAs) have been used to develop MTD
mechanisms. Crouse and Fulp [38] employed a GA to identify
a secure computer configuration (e.g., OSes or applications)
with high diversity in time and/or space. They modeled a com-
puter configuration as a chromosome in which an individual
configuration is treated as a trait or allele. Based on the attack
resilience, a top ranked computer configuration is selected.
The authors extended their work in [40] to investigate how
‘chromosome pool management’ can enhance the diversity of
computer configurations based on a GA-based approach. In
particular, they considered the aging aspect of configurations
to reflect vulnerability that can be introduced by an aged
configuration. In addition, the authors enhanced their GA-
based MTD to change computer configurations by changing
mutation as well as using the feedback about system security
status [84]. Zhuang et al. [172] also used a GA to generate
system configurations with high diversity for maximizing
system security.
Lucas et al. [96] described a host-level implementation of
an evolutionary strategy for MTD that proactively discov-
ers secured alternative configurations over time. This work
is based on the evolutionary approach originally introduced
in [38]. The evolutionary based MTD models computers
as chromosomes. The computer configurations are generated
using an evolutionary algorithm (EA) with a series of opera-
tions such as reproduction, recombination, and mutation. This
implementation prototype consists of mainly the following
three components: (i) EA that discovers the configurations;
(ii) virtual machine (VM) that implements the algorithm; and
(iii) assessment for scoring the chromosomes.
Recently, Ge et al. [54] discussed a GA-based approach
for optimizing the network shuffling in an SDN-based IoT
network. In this work, the authors considered two types of
the IoT nodes (e.g., decoy and real nodes), and designed
three metrics, including the number of attack paths towards
the decoy targets, mean time to security failure, and defense
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cost. These metrics are optimized for the network shuffling
technique.
Pros and Cons: GAs can be a useful approach as they
attempt to find the best or near optimal solution(s). However,
developing a fitness function that can provide a diverse so-
lution space for design decisions in MTD techniques is not
a trivial task as the design of an MTD technique needs to
accommodate multiple conflicting system goals. In addition,
for a large solution space, efficiency becomes an issue, limiting
scalability. Further, for resource-constrained environments, a
GA-based solution is not attractive due to high complexity.
C. Machine Learning-based MTD
Vikram et al. [154] proposed an MTD technique by ran-
domizing HTML elements for web services to deal with the
web bot attacks. The authors used ML to enhance the effec-
tiveness of the proposed strategy, evaluating their proposed
technique by measuring page loading time overhead. This ML-
based MTD technique incurs low overhead while effectively
thwarting attacks.
Colbaugh and Glass [36] proposed a predictive MTD tech-
nique using ML aiming to mitigate the adversary’s ability to
learn about the defensive mechanism. In this work, the authors
supposed that attackers can learn and may leverage a reverse-
engineering method to anticipate the defensive strategies. They
evaluated their algorithm using cybersecurity datasets to show
the effectiveness and robustness of their approach. The authors
used another approach to deal with the same problem in
[35]. They leveraged a defensive MTD and an ML-based
method using the co-evolutionary relationship between both an
attacker and defender to derive an optimal defensive strategy
that is hard to reverse-engineer.
Zhu et al. [167] proposed two iterative reinforcement learn-
ing algorithms to identify an ideal defense strategy against cy-
berattacks especially when the information about the attackers
is unknown or limited. They used Markov chains and stochas-
tic stability in the algorithms by introducing the adaptive,
robust reinforcement learning capability. They showed that
their method can provide the nearly optimal defensive strategy.
Tozer et al. [149] proposed a multi-objective reinforcement
learning algorithm to minimize the attack surface of a system.
They designed a system to generate a multi-objective Markov
Decision Process using the system’s components and behaviors
to identify optimal policies.
Sengupta et al. [131] proposed an MTD framework (MT-
Deep) for Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) that increases
security and robustness of the DNNs against the adversarial
attacks. In MTDeep, an input image is classified randomly
selecting a network from an ensemble of the networks which is
based on a strategy generated via game-theoretic reasoning. An
interaction between the image classification system is modeled
with MTDeep (i.e., an ensemble of DNNs) and its users
(i.e., adversarial and legitimate) into a Repeated Bayesian
Game. The defender’s configurations space are the ensemble
of DNNs which are trained for the same task, but they are
not affected by the same attack. Stackelberg equilibrium of
the game provides the optimal switching strategy for MTDeep
reducing the misclassification on adversarially modified image
with high classification accuracy for the legitimate users of
the system. Recently, Song et al. [144] designed an MTD-
based approach for embedded deep visual sensing systems
against adversarial examples for generating multiple new deep
models (e.g., multilayer perceptrons and convolutional neural
networks) which can be used to collaboratively detecting and
thwarting the adversarial examples. The adversarial examples
are inputs to a neural network (e.g., deep model) that makes
wrong classification results. The deep models are generated
dynamically using the concept of MTD after the system
deployment. The post-deployment of the models are different
across the systems. This approach invalidates an essential
basis to the attackers and disrupts them to build effective
adversarial examples. Similarly, Farchi et al. [47] proposed
a strategic ML-selection approach defending against the ad-
versarial machine learning. In this work, the authors suggested
that the attacks against the learning can be reduced with careful
design of strategic selection of learning methods and attributes.
The defender implements multiple learners with their strategic
activation computation using the game-theoretic approach.
Pros and Cons: ML-based MTD allows a system to capture
evolving attack patterns with high scalability and applicability.
However, as the performance of ML often requires a large
amount of data for training in order to guarantee a certain
level of prediction accuracy, then when there is a lack of data,
the performance is less than desired even with high overhead
and complexity. Further, we need to ensure a sufficient level of
computational power available in a given environment where
MTD is deployed as some resource-constrained environments
cannot afford ML-based MTD.
Some other MTD techniques have used other approaches,
which do not use any of the above methodologies (i.e., game
theory, genetic algorithms, or machine learning). Those are
already discussed in Section IV based on the three categories
of operation-based MTD (i.e., shuffling, diversity, and redun-
dancy).
D. Discussions on the Existing MTD Modeling & Solution
Techniques
We observed the following trends in key modeling and
solution techniques used to develop MTD in the literature:
• A large volume of game theoretic MTD approaches:
As discussed earlier, due to the substantial advantages of
game theoretic approaches in terms of the flexibility of
problem formulation that can reflect diverse scenarios in
most domains, game theoretic approaches are dominantly
employed in developing MTD. However, again we should
keep the caveats in mind in terms of the rationality of
players, solution complexity, and misperception or uncer-
tainty in decision making, as discussed in Section VI-A. In
addition, we found that several game theories are dominantly
used such as a Bayesian Stackelberg game or a stochastic
game. To better deal with uncertainty or misperception in
the decision making, hypergame theory [55] can be applied
to consider more realistic scenarios which should reflect
uncertainty and bounded rationality.
19
ASP
12
Attack utility
7
Learning
1
MTTC
5
Unpredictability
3
Attack surface
2
Fig. 6. Metrics measuring MTD effectiveness by an attacker’s perspective.
• GA-based MTD for identifying the optimal deployment
of system configurations: When a problem size becomes
large, evolutionary algorithms, such as genetic algorithms
(GAs), are often used to maximize solution optimality. But
as discussed earlier, the downside of GA-based MTD is a
lack of scalability with high complexity for large-scale or
resource-constrained environments. In addition, ensuring a
centralized entity to make MTD decisions based on GAs
may not be guaranteed for some fully distributed environ-
ments.
• ML-based MTD to hinder an attacker’s learning or
select a best defense strategy: The high performance of ML
in learning attack patterns or identifying optimal solutions is
attractive when a large volume of data is available. However,
under a small set of data and/or highly dynamic datasets,
ML-based solutions can be somewhat expensive without
introducing a significant benefit of using it. Further, we need
to ensure a sufficient level of computational power available
by a trusted entity to manage MTD operations.
Table V summarizes the key modeling and solution techniques
of MTD and their pros and cons discussed above.
VII. METRICS FOR MTD
The underlying idea of MTD techniques has been explored;
accordingly many MTD techniques have been developed.
However, no standard metrics have been proposed to measure
their effectiveness and/or efficiency. In this section, we discuss
what metrics have been used to assess the effectiveness and
efficiency of the existing MTD techniques. Along with the
discussions of the overall trends observed from this survey,
we address some limitations of the metrics used in the state-
of-the-art MTD approaches.
A. Metrics for Measuring MTD Effectiveness
We discuss the metrics to measure the effectiveness of
MTD techniques in terms of the perspectives of an attacker
and a defender. The attacker’s metric estimates its attack
performance, indicating that the attacker’s high performance
refers to the defender’s low performance, and vice-versa.
The defender’s metric measures its performance in achieving
security and/or defense goals of a given system.
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Fig. 7. Metrics measuring MTD effectiveness by a defender’s perspective.
The attacker’s metrics estimates the adverse impact of the
proposed MTD techniques on the attacker’s performance and
are obtained by:
• Attack success probability (ASP) [3, 9, 20, 23, 24, 26, 30,
43, 46, 127, 138, 161]: This metric refers to the probability
that attacks are successfully performed. For example, it
refers to the probability that a system component (or de-
fender) is compromised or a target is successfully discovered
and/or accessed by an attacker. Rahman et al. [127] also used
a metric called attackability, which refers to the probability
that an attacker can access system states (or components)
to the attack. This metric combines the degree of system
vulnerability plus the feasibility an attacker accesses and
performs an attack based on its own resource level. But
in the sense that it measures the degree for the attacker
to successfully access a system component, this metric is
aligned with ASP.
• Attack utility [5, 6, 20, 109, 125, 168, 169]: When the inter-
actions between attackers and defenders and their best strate-
gies are considered based on game theoretic approaches, the
payoff (or utility) of an attacker is used to measure the gain
or loss by deploying a proposed MTD.
• Learning by attackers [168]: This measures the degree
of an attacker’s learning toward the payoff obtained by a
defender upon the performed attack.
• Mean time to compromise a system (MTTC) [4, 24,
25, 30, 173]: This indicates how long an attacker takes
to compromise an entire system. In terms of a defender’s
perspective, this metric is similar to mean time to failure
(MTTF), as described under a defender’s metrics below.
• Unpredictability [60, 100, 136]: This indicates how much
confusion and/or uncertainty a given MTD has introduced
to attackers.
• Attack surface [102, 104]: This metric is defined as the
amount of system resources that can be used by attackers
to attack the system, such as channels, data items, and/or
methods. Hence, a larger attack surface exposes more vul-
nerabilities.
In the literature, various types of the defender’s metrics are
used to measure MTD effectiveness in terms of the following
metrics:
• Defense success probability (DSP) [3, 33, 36, 161]: We
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call metrics measuring the success of an MTD technique
DSP in this work. Zaffarano et al. [161] estimated the rate
of executing successful defenses (e.g., for a defender, the
rate at which tasks are executed and completed) or attacks
(e.g., for an attacker, the rate at which attacks are performed
and successfully completed). Colbaugh and Glass [36] used
a detection accuracy of anomaly behaviors, such as attack
behaviors or spams in order to determine whether to trigger
an MTD operation. Clark et al. [33] measured the portion of
decoy nodes detected by attackers when IP randomization
techniques are used in order to measure the success of the
IP-shuffling MTD strategy. Al-Shaer et al. [3] measured an
IP-mutation success probability to measure the effectiveness
of the MTD. This metric measures the probability that a
mutated IP is not hit by scanning attacks.
• Mean time to failure (MTTF) [24, 25, 30, 173]: This refers
to a system reliability metric capturing the system’s up-time
in the presence of attacks when failures can happen due to
either defects or security threats. This metric is the same as
MTTC under the attacker’s metrics.
• Defense utility [20, 109, 125, 168, 169]: Game theoretic
approaches for the optimal deployment of MTD techniques
have taken to identify the best defense strategy by a de-
fender. The payoff (or utility) of the defender measures the
effectiveness of an MTD technique.
• Learning by defenders [168]: This metric measures the
degree of a defender’s learning toward the payoff an attacker
has obtained upon a defense action taken by the defender.
• System security: Various kinds of metrics measure the
system security properties enhanced by proposed MTD
techniques:
– Confidentiality [125, 165, 161]: This measures how
many system components are compromised [125]. In
some context, some information should be kept confiden-
tial, such as private information. The degree of preserving
confidential or private information is another metric to
indicate the degree of security. In [161], mission con-
fidentiality refers to the degree of exposing confidential
information to unauthorized parties while attack confiden-
tiality means the degree of attack behaviors detected by
a defender.
– Integrity [161]: Integrity metric is discussed in terms of
mission integrity and attack integrity. Mission integrity
refers to how much information related to executing a
given mission is communicated without being modified
and/or forged, while attack integrity indicates how much
accurate information the attackers view.
– Availability [60, 125]: This indicates the portion of
system assets that are not compromised to provide a
normal service.
– Degree of vulnerability [4, 5, 6, 20, 23, 24, 25, 168]:
This measures the probability that a given platform to
be selected is vulnerable during a particular time period
or a given system component is vulnerable because it is
controlled by an attacker.
• Other metrics: Based on the unique features of each of the
existing MTD approaches, various other types of metrics
have been adopted to measure the effectiveness of MTD as
follows:
– Controllability [125]: This refers to the portion of critical
system assets which expose a high vulnerability to an
attacker if compromised.
– Worm propagation speed [3, 78, 79]: This measures
how much a deployed MTD can slow down actions by
an attacker. This also indirectly increases the detection of
attackers by earning more time to monitor the attacker.
– Vastness [60, 100, 104, 165]: This measures the size
of spaces that a given defense mechanism can cover,
such as IP spaces an attacker needs to scan through. In
addition, the number of target hosts set by a defender
can consume an attacker’s resource because it determines
all the possibilities the attacker needs to scan through.
In [104], this is considered based on the metric called
‘attack surface measurements.’
– Periodicity [60, 100]: This estimates how often system
configurations change in order to provide a sufficient level
of confusion to attackers.
– Uniqueness [60, 100]: This measures how uniquely an
individual entity (e.g., a host) is authorized to a system
without being accessed by other entities.
– Revocability [60, 100]: This measures the degree of fre-
quency to terminate or expire a prior system configuration
(e.g., access control or a given IP configuration).
– Distinguishability [60, 100]: This measures how well a
given defense distinguishes trustworthy entities from non-
trustworthy entities.
– Loss in rewards between an optimal deployment and
an executed deployment [132]: This metric captures how
much loss occurred for the actual execution of an MTD
operation over the optimal deployment.
The metrics to measure the effectiveness of existing MTD
techniques are summarized in Figs. 6 and 7 based on 27 papers
published during 2011-2018. Note that more than one metric
can appear in a single paper. The general trends observed from
the survey are: (1) the attack success probability (e.g., whether
an attacker achieved its goal of a launched attack such as
finding a vulnerable target) is a dominant metric used for the
effectiveness of MTD aiming to minimize this metric; (2) due
to a large volume of game theoretic approaches in the state-
of-the-art MTD techniques, the payoff or utility of attackers
or defenders is also one of dominant metrics used in the
existing MTD techniques; and (3) some system-level metrics
measuring system vulnerability or reliability (e.g., degree of
vulnerability, MTTF or mean time to compromise an entire
system) in the presence of attacks are observed as major
metrics used to measure MTD effectiveness.
B. Metrics for Measuring MTD Efficiency
The attacker’s metrics are used to capture how much cost
(or penalty) is introduced for an attacker to achieve attack
success when a proposed MTD is deployed, as follows:
• Penalty in attack payoff [49, 83, 158, 165]: Many game
theoretic MTD approaches estimate attack cost at an abstract
level (e.g., cost is 1 for attacking; 0 otherwise).
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Fig. 8. Metrics measuring MTD efficiency by a defender’s perspective.
• Attack cost [6, 5, 85, 103, 138]: This measures how much
overhead and/or impact is introduced to attackers to perform
their attacks. To be specific, an attacker’s scanning tool, such
as Nmap, is used to capture the scanning overhead [85].
The MTD efficiency by the attacker’s perspective is mainly
measured by two types of metrics as above although both
metrics are concerned about resources the attacker needs to
invest to launch a planned attack. Due to the similar nature of
both metrics and their small volume, we omit the figure.
The defender’s metrics to measure MTD efficiency that
are commonly observed in the literature include:
• Quality-of-Service (QoS) to users [33, 62, 158]: This met-
ric captures the degree of service quality provided to users
while implementing a given MTD technique as triggering
an MTD (e.g., platform migration) often hinders service
availability to normal users [62, 158]. In addition, upon de-
ploying IP mutation techniques, the number of connections
interrupted [33] is used to measure QoS provided to users.
• System performance [7, 31, 34, 45, 51, 62, 77, 95, 108,
123, 154, 155, 164]: This metric measures how much
overhead is introduced to deploy a given MTD, such
as message overhead (e.g., delay, packet loss, or control
packet overhead) [45, 164], operational delay [108, 164] /
cost [51, 62, 154, 155, 164] to deploy an MTD, the number
of dropped connections [34], or performance overhead (e.g.,
file sizes or performance degradation to distribute software
for diversity) [77]. System performance is also captured by
system throughput measuring how much a given system
(or network) can maintain its performance in terms of
network throughput (e.g., how many messages are correctly
delivered) [7, 164] or server throughput (e.g., how many
queries are properly provided) [123].
• Defense cost: Various aspects of defense cost are measured
to indicate the efficiency of MTD techniques. An abstract
level of defense cost (i.e., migration cost or maintenance cost
of VMs) [30, 49, 83, 158, 165] is used to measure the cost
of a deployed MTD mechanism, which is mostly used in
game theoretic MTD. Some defense cost captures the level
of infrastructure (e.g., a number of proxy or decoy nodes)
required to ensure a required level of service availability [83,
158]. Some other works also used specific metrics to capture
defense cost as follows:
– Address space overhead [3]: In deploying Random IP
mutation techniques, this refers to the required address
space based on mutation speed (e.g., low frequency
mutation, LFM, or high frequency mutation, HFM).
– Flow table size [78, 79, 164]: This measures the size of
flow table in OpenFlow (OF) switches when OF-RHM
(Random Host Mutation) is used in an SDN-based MTD.
– Integrated performance cost [34, 51]: This metric inte-
grates both performance and security cost. Ge et al. [51]
considered bandwidth cost and risk at servers upon being
attacked to calculate the overall performance cost. Clark
et al. [34] defined the cost function in terms of the number
of active sessions, caused by triggering MTD operations,
and the fraction of decoy nodes scanned by attackers. In
these works, the goal is to minimize the performance cost
that reflects defense cost, security, and service availability
to users.
– Strategy switching cost [132]: This cost measures the
switching cost (e.g., migration cost). Sengupta et al.
[132] estimated the switching cost in switching web-stack
configurations as a cost metric.
– Power consumption [163]: When MTD is deployed in
resource-constrained environments such as wireless sen-
sor networks or IoT environments, energy consumption is
one of the key design considerations. How much benefit
is introduced over the power consumption by deploying
an MTD technique is a critical metric to measure the
efficiency of the MTD.
The metrics to measure the efficiency of MTD by a de-
fender’s perspective are summarized in Fig. 8 based on 25
papers published during 2011-2018. Since more than one
metric can be used in a paper, the number of metrics countered
is not the same as the total number of works examined in this
survey.
As demonstrated in Fig. 8, most metrics measuring MTD
efficiency belong to system performance or defense cost.
However, the level of QoS provided to users are significantly
less studied. This means MTD technology focuses more on
enhancing system security and performance with minimum
cost while service availability for users to provide seamless,
continuous service provision has remained much less explored
in designing MTD techniques. Since deploying and executing
MTD mechanisms to a system introduces a critical tradeoff
between security, defense cost, and service availability, an
optimization problem with these dual conflicting goals should
be investigated in-depth to meet multiple criteria from both
system goals (i.e., multi-objective optimization problem) [29].
VIII. EVALUATION METHODS FOR MTD
MTD techniques have been verified by using various types
of evaluation techniques. In this section, we discuss how the
performance of MTD techniques have been assessed based on
the following evaluation methods: (1) analytical models; (2)
simulation models; (3) emulation models; and (4) real testbeds.
A. Analytical Model-based MTD Evaluation
1) Probabilistic Model-based MTD Evaluation: In proba-
bilistic models, the behaviors of a system, an attacker, and
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a defender and the interactions between them are described
based on probabilistic parameters. Okhravi et al. [115] con-
structed a probability model to measure the mean time to
security failure (MTTSF) where the security failure is defined
by the system state being compromised by an attacker where
the system is defended by MTDs. Zhuang et al. [170] also
modeled the relationship between the frequency of diversity-
based MTD and ASP. Carroll et al. [23] provided probabilistic
models to measure the effectiveness of an address shuffling-
based MTD technique based on ASP with respect to the
network size, the addresses space scanned, the degree of
system vulnerability, and the frequency of shuffling operations.
Crouse et al. [39] developed probabilistic models to measure
ASP when a set of reconnaissance defenses, including honey-
pots as a deception technique and network address shuffling
as MTD, is deployed in a given system, under varying the
network size, the size of honeypots deployment, and the
number of vulnerable nodes. Cho and Ben-Asher [30] used a
probabilistic model by building a Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN)
model to describe an integrated defense system consisting of
MTD, deception, and an IDS and analyzed the performance
of the integrated defense system compared to the system
with various combinations of defense mechanisms (i.e., an
IDS only or IDS plus either deception or MTD) in terms of
ASP and MTTSF (i.e., system lifetime). Sharma et al. [138]
used probabilistic models to measure the effectiveness of the
proposed IP-multiplexing based network shuffling techniques
in terms of ASP and defense cost. Luo et al. [98] used
probabilistic models to verify the effectiveness of a port
hopping-based MTD technique against reconnaissance attacks
in terms of ASP.
Pros and Cons: The evaluation of probabilistic models pro-
vides insights and lessons based on the observations of general
system behaviors with minimum evaluation cost. However,
due to the probabilistic parameterization of all the key system
design features, a certain level of simplicity and abstraction
is unavoidable and may not be able to capture some devia-
tions and/or unexpected effect that can be introduced in real
application scenarios.
2) Graphical Security Model-based MTD Evaluation: The
graph-based security models (GSM) have been proposed and
widely used in modeling and analysis of the network security
using attack graphs (AGs) [141] and attack trees (ATs) [130].
The hierarchical attack representation model (HARM) [65]
has been developed to model a system’s security features
with two layers, an upper layer and a lower layer. The
upper layer represents a network’s reachability information
(i.e., network topological information) using an AG while
the lower layer represents a node’s vulnerability information
using ATs, as shown in Fig. 9. A comprehensive assess-
ment of the effectiveness of MTD techniques (i.e., shuffling,
diversity, and redundancy) have been developed using the
HARM [5, 67, 69]. Hong et al. [70] proposed a technique
to capture dynamic changes in the network resulted from
deploying MTD techniques through the simulation. To this
end, they incorporated MTD techniques into the temporal
graph-based graphical security model [160] and then evaluated
(a) An example cloud model.
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(b) Two-layer HARM of the example cloud in (a).
Fig. 9. The cloud model example [65] showing an attacker (A) and a target
(e.g., database, or DB) where (a) illustrates the cloud model and (b) shows the
two-layer HARM of the cloud example including an AG in the upper layer
and ATs in the lower layer capturing vulnerabilities (denoted by vi) existing
on each VM.
their MTD techniques using the dynamic security metrics.
Pros and Cons: The main advantages of using GSMs are
the ease of evaluation and representation. Furthermore, GSMs
can be adopted to compute various security metrics based on
the MTD application. A GSM can be easily visualized and
help the network administrators or cloud providers to find out
the vulnerabilities of the network and choose appropriate de-
fensive strategies like MTD techniques. However, generating
and analyzing GSMs in large-scale networks suffers from a
scalability issue. Although this has been improved by using
HARM which is more scalable than the other GSMs, it is
still challenging to model the very large-scale networks using
GSMs.
B. Simulation Model-based MTD Evaluation
Most studies evaluating the performance of MTD ap-
proaches have been validated based on simulation experiments.
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TABLE VI
EVALUATION METHODS OF MTD TECHNIQUES: PROS VS. CONS.
Evaluation Method Pros Cons
Analytical Models Providing theoretical background and understanding with
minimum cost; ease of modeling, representation, and
evaluation
Scalability issues with some analyaitcal models (e.g., GSM,
SPN); limitations in reflecting realistic scenarios due to
abstraction/simplicity traded off for efficiency
Simulation Better flexibility in attack/system modeling than analytical
models; easy parameterization for sensitivity analysis
Limitations due to inherent uncertainty toward real-world
applications
Emulation High validity; high modeling flexibility; more realistic
scenarios
Lack of scalability due to issues in limited hardware
computational resources; still maintaining a certain level of
abstraction/simplicity
Real Testbeds Highest flexibility and validity in modeling and experiments
among all other available evaluation tools
Least scalability in complexity and cost among all available
evaluation tools
Compared to analytical models, simulation models have more
flexibility in modeling specific attack behaviors (e.g., periodic
attacks [83], DDoS attacks [170], Multi-Armed Bandit policy-
based attacks [121], sequential attacks on attack surface [26]),
and various testing scenarios characterizing unique environ-
mental features (e.g., cloud-based service computing [120],
wireless sensor networks using IPv6-based MTD [162]). Some
simulation studies add MTD features into existing network
simulators (e.g., NeSSi2 [170]).
Pros and Cons: Simulation models provide high flexibility in
modeling diverse types of attacks, environmental conditions,
and/or different types of MTD techniques as most design
features can be easily parameterized without much restriction.
Due to the flexibility and experimental capability to conduct
sensitivity analysis by varying the values of key design param-
eters, it allows us to easily obtain meaningful insights before
performing the implementation in a real system. However,
the simulation model has its inherent limitations because all
possible variables may not be captured due to the nature
of existing, uncontrollable uncertainty. Therefore, the lessons
obtained from the simulation studies may not be realized in
real testbed-based experiments or systems.
C. Emulation Model-based MTD Evaluation
Compared to the simulation-based studies, results from
emulation testbed-based experiments can even provide a
higher validity on experimental results although emulation-
based studies are not common as much as simulation studies.
Aydeger et al. [13] proposed an SDN-based route mutation
technique to deal with DDoS attacks which are validated via
the implementation on the Mininet emulator with a Floodlight
SDN controller. Further, Aydeger et al. [14] defined a route
mutation MTD technique for the Internet Service Provider
(ISP) network context through NFV and virtual shadows
network aiming to thwart possible DDoS attack. Their route
mutation method makes it difficult for the attackers to perform
attack reconnaissance phase and obtain network topology
information. They implemented their work in an emulated
environment using Mininet and evaluated the effectiveness
of their framework in terms of success rate and overhead
which measures defensive costs, such as storage cost and
end-to-end (ETE) delay. Jafarian et al. [79] presented an
OF random host mutation technique, and validated it via the
Mininet emulator with an NOX SDN controller. Skowyra et al.
[143] constructed an enterprise-like network topology using
the Mininet emulator, and validated the network performance
in terms of time-to-first-byte and total download time, and the
security robustness is evaluated by testing several classes of
cyberattacks.
Pros and Cons: Emulation models can provide a higher valid-
ity than simulation models in the experimental results validated
through them. In addition, they also provide higher flexibility
in modeling realistic attack types and MTD techniques than
simulation-based evaluation. However, most emulation-based
test environments (e.g., Mininet) running on a single machine
share the same hardware resources for all emulation elements,
making it difficult to evaluate experiments for large-scale
networks.
D. Real Testbed-based MTD Evaluation
1) SDN-based Testbeds: MacFarland and Shue [100] pro-
posed a host-based MTD technique to defend against network
reconnaissance attacks on an SDN environment and validated
their proposed method via the implementation of an SDN
controller and DNS/NAT (Network Address Translator) func-
tionalities on the Ubuntu OS using Python scripts. Hong et al.
[68] presented a shuffling-based optimal network reconfigura-
tion method on SDNs. They constructed a real SDN testbed
consisting of SDN-enabled hardware switches and an SDN
controller to carry out performance analysis when the proposed
shuffling-based MTD technique is deployed on the network.
Wang et al. [156] constructed a real enterprise-like SDN topol-
ogy with Open vSwitch (OVS) and Ryu SDN controller to
verify their proposed U-TRI (Unlinkability Through Random
Identifier) MTD technique.
2) Cloud or Web-based Environment: Kampanakis et al.
[85] presented an AG-based MTD countermeasure selection
method. They constructed a prototypical virtualized cloud
computing platform on Openstack and validated the perfor-
mance overhead of the proposed method on the Cloud-based
testbed. Vikram et al. [154] proposed a novel MTD technique
that defends against web bots which automatically send re-
quests to remote web servers by hiding the correct name/ID
parameter values of HTML elements. Security effectiveness
and performance overhead of the proposed technique are tested
on the web platform testbeds. Penner and Guirguis [121] de-
veloped a set of MTD techniques that randomize the locations
of VMs in the cloud against Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB)
policy-based attacks. The authors demonstrated the proposed
defense strategies in an OpenStack-based cloud environment
24
Fig. 10. An example deployment of MTD techniques in an enterprise
network [171].
and evaluated their performance based on migration downtime
and network traffic.
Pros and Cons: Real testbeds can help verify the performance
of MTD techniques under more realistic system environments.
However, it is difficult to evaluate the MTD techniques in
large-scale networks. Most real testbed-based studies have
focused on evaluating the performance of MTD in small or
mid-sized networks.
We summarize the pros and cons of each evaluation method
discussed above in Table VI.
IX. APPLICATION DOMAINS OF MTD TECHNIQUES
MTD techniques have been deployed in diverse application
domains. We discuss how MTD techniques have been applied
in the following environments: (1) enterprise networks; (2)
Internet-of-Things (IoT); (3) cyber-physical systems (CPS);
(4) software-defined networks (SDNs); and (5) cloud-based
Web services. In this section, we aim to answer what MTD
techniques, attack behaviors, design methodologies / theories,
and evaluation methods are used in existing MTD techniques
developed under each domain.
A. Enterprise Networks
An enterprise networked system is homogeneously and
statically configured. Since the enterprise networked system
is built to operate in a static configuration, the attackers
are relatively easy to plan and launch successful attacks to
penetrate into the system. In addition, the attacker can develop
mechanisms to make attacks dynamic, aiming at defeating
detection mechanisms.
MTD Techniques: The common MTD techniques used for
enterprise networks are mostly shuffling or diversity-based.
The examples include platform migrations or system diver-
sity [20, 30, 46, 49], server location migrations [51, 158],
software stack diversity [161], proxy shuffling [83], or IP
mutation [34].
Main Attacks: Most MTD approaches developed for enter-
prise networks countermeasured worm attacks [51], DDoS
[51, 83, 158], abstracted attacks in an attack-defense
game [49], scanning attacks [20, 30, 34], APT attacks [161], or
more sophisticated, multi-stage attacks, including circumven-
tion attacks, deputy attacks, entropy reducing attacks, probing
attacks, and incremental attacks [46].
Fig. 11. An example deployment of MTD in an IoT environment [101]:
Context-aware code partitioning and diversification.
Key Methodologies: Since majority of existing MTD ap-
proaches have used game theoretic approaches, many MTD
techniques for enterprise networks have used in an attack-
defense game where the MTD techniques are used as
defense strategies. The examples include utility-concerned,
incentive-compatible MTD [51], game theoretic approaches
(Bayesian Stackelberg game [49], empirical game-theoretic
analysis [158], moving target game [83]), or decision utility
model [20]. Some MTD research focused on developing the
assessment tools to measure the performance of MTD tech-
niques, such as quantitative MTD assessment framework [161]
or model-based probability models to estimate the effective-
ness of MTD techniques [43, 46].
Evaluation Methods: As seen in Section VIII, most MTD
approaches have used simulation-based experiments for the
performance validation. The similar trends are observed in
evaluating MTD techniques for enterprise networks , which
are mainly validated based on simulation models [20, 34, 49,
51, 83, 158, 161] while the use of a model-based probabil-
ity/analytical models was not common [30].
Fig. 10 depicts the architecture of the MTD deployment
in an enterprise network [171]. The MTD mechanism is
implemented in the configuration manager which produces
effective configurations with intelligent adaptations.
Pros and Cons: Many MTD approaches for enterprise net-
works have been developed using game theoretic approaches
by modeling an attack-defense game. As discussed in Sec-
tion VI-A, modeling and formulating the interactions between
an attacker and defender and estimating their utilities can
be easily formulated using the game theoretic approaches.
However, due to a certain level of abstractions on specific
attack / defense behaviors or strategies, how much those can
be applicable in practice still remained unclear. Further, most
works are validated based on analytical or simulation models,
which inherently introduce a certain level of abstraction and/or
omission in modeling the behaviors of a system and players
(i.e., an attacker and defender), which inherently limits the
applicability.
B. Internet-of-Things (IoT)
IoT refers to a network environment characterized by het-
erogeneous devices interacting with each other where the
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devices are controlled by machines and/or humans. Recently,
the advance of IoT technologies has contributed to developing
innovative applications in various domains [128]. However,
due to its large scale and severe resource constraints relying
on limited bandwidth and/or power, conventional security /
defense mechanisms (e.g., endpoint anti-virus software) has
shown its limitations for applicability in IoT environments.
Therefore, the threats and/or attacks encountered in IoT en-
vironments have been hurdles in providing seamless, normal
services and operation of IoT-based systems [53]. The MTD
paradigm is an emerging, new technology concept that can
provide the capability to protect an IoT system even under
the challenges. In this section, we discuss the key MTD tech-
niques, attacks, methodologies, and evaluation methods used
to develop MTD technologies to protect IoT environments.
MTD Techniques: In the literature, most IoT-based MTD
techniques are shuffling or diversity-based. The examples in-
clude mutation of cryptosystem and/or firmware version [26],
IP randomization [140], IPv6 rotation (i.e., µMT6D) [162],
or code partitioning and diversification on IoT devices [101].
Since IoT concerns severe resource constraints because most
of them are mobile devices, developing lightweight shuffling-
based MTD is a key concern in IoT-based MTD.
Main Attacks: The most common attack behaviors considered
in IoT-based MTD approaches are reconnaissance (scanning)
attacks [101, 140, 162, 163] although some conventional
attacks, such as cryptographic attacks [26], are also con-
sidered. Although more intelligent, smarter attack behaviors
have been extensively studied in IoT environments, IoT-based
MTD techniques dealing with APT attacks have been rarely
studied [107].
Key Methodologies: Casola et al. [26] identified recon-
figurable architectural layers to develop shuffling-based or
diversity-based MTD in terms of security and physical layers.
IP shuffling-based MTD has been developed based on IPv6 for
IoT devices [140, 162, 163]. Mahmood and Shila [101] used
minimal trusted code in an IoT device, which can be erased
after it was used in order to ensure security in a resource-
constrained IoT environment.
Evaluation Methods: As observed in other domains, simu-
lation testeds are the most popular validation method. A real
IoT testbed with end devices (e.g., laptops), called ‘6LoWPAN
testbed’ [140], is developed to validate IP shuffling MTD.
Some recent studies developed the testbeds for IP mutation-
based MTD using IPv6 [162, 163].
Fig. 11 shows an implementation of MTD in IoT devices
where context-aware coding and diversification is used as
an MTD technique where a minimal device code is used to
ensure system security in a resource-constrained IoT environ-
ment [101].
Pros and Cons: The conventional security standard following
the concept of defense-in-depth may not protect IoT devices
because you cannot install those mechanisms into the IoT
devices and difficult to view and monitor the activities hap-
pening inside the device. An effective deployment of MTD
technique in IoT that confuses an attacker at the very first
phase of the cyber kill chain by APT attackers can make a
target invisible, and invalidate their intelligence obtained from
reconnaissance. Therefore, MTD makes the attackers harder
to map the devices, exploit their vulnerabilities and launch
the attacks. However, the constraints on IoT devices (e.g.,
CPU, energy consumption, memory) and network (e.g., low-
bandwidth, high packet-loss) limit the effectiveness of MTD
in IoT environments.
C. Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
CPS is a system with cyber capabilities in physical worlds
embracing humans, infrastructure or platforms that allow to
communicate to each other [122]. The advance of CPS has
been made along with increased cyber capabilities in terms of
communications, networking, sensing, and computing as well
as enhanced capabilities of physical systems with materials,
hardware, and/or sensors/actuators. The unique aspect of CPS
is from the coexistence and coordinations between cyber
capabilities and physical resources [122]. In this section, we
discuss what key MTD techniques, attacks, methodologies,
and evaluation methods are considered in existing MTD tech-
niques developed for CPS.
MTD Techniques: MTD techniques have been developed
to protect CPS environments. Li et al. [95] developed a
lightweight, adaptive packet morphing technique; Potteiger
et al. [124] used an instruction set randomization to protect
a vehicular network. Some MTD works are proposed to
protect supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
system, such as IP hopping mutating the IP addresses of
the gateway router in a power grid SCADA [116], Dynamic
Generated Containment System (DGCS) [28], or IP hopping
at an SCADA [150].
Main Attacks: The attack behaviors considered in developing
MTD techniques for CPS include code injection attacks in a
vehicular network [124], eavesdropping and/or traffic analysis
attacks [95, 116], IP scanning attacks [116], brute-force login,
zero-day exploit, a malicious binary upload, and DDoS [28],
IP spoofing, relay attack, vulnerability scanning, OS detec-
tion [150].
Key Methodologies: Li et al. [95] formulated a traffic morph-
ing problem as an optimization problem aiming to minimize
the number of redundant packets in the traffic morphing
process. Pappa et al. [116] developed an MTD architecture
on Iowa State’s PowerCyber testbed for targeted cyberattacks
with a real world SCADA software and physical relays. Chin
and Xiong [28] also developed the Dynamic Generated Con-
tainment System (DGCS) based on a virtualized Docker [106]
to protect the host service and to detect a threat. Ulrich
et al. [150] developed an IP hopping MTD based on four
transformations of IP changes, two translations of the data-
gram’s source address (SNAT) and the destination (DNAT),
respectively.
Evaluation Methods: Li et al. [95] conducted a simulation
study to validate the proposed traffic morphing algorithm using
a synthetic CPS network traffic and real-world network traces,
including TCP and UDP packet-headers, to obtain target
sessions. Pappa et al. [116] validated an IP-hopping technique
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Fig. 12. An example architecture of IP hopping MTD in an smart grid
SCADA [116].
for a SCADA system on Iowa State’s PowerCyber testbed.
Chin and Xiong [28] used Global Environment for Network
Innovation (GENI), a virtual lab to conduct experiments in
a large-scale network with multiple containers for validat-
ing the proposed MTD technique (i.e., Dynamic Generated
Containment System, DGCS) based on the emulated system.
Ulrich et al. [150] simulated a SCADA environment in terms
of network traffics and delays to validate the performance of
the IP hopping MTD in terms of throughput and delay.
Fig. 12 shows an example deployment of IP hopping based
MTD in a smart grid SCADA network based on [116].
Pros and Cons: SCADA-based systems are generally used for
monitoring and controlling physical devices span in large geo-
graphic distances which are the part of national infrastructures
(e.g., water distribution, oil and natural gas pipelines, power
grids, and transportation systems) and are critical to a nation’s
economy and safety. MTD mechanisms to SCADA systems
can protect the CPS system by adding an additional layer of
defenses in addition to enhancing the effectiveness of MTD.
However, an effective deployment of the MTD mechanisms
should not adversely impact the core performance of a system,
including safety, reliability, availability, and predictability in
running operations of the CPS.
D. Software Defined Networks (SDNs)
An SDN has emerged as a promising technology to decou-
ple the network control plane from the data-forwarding plane
for providing flexibility, robustness, and programmability to
a networked system. In conventional networks, a routing
algorithm in each switch makes packet forwarding decisions.
By contrast, a controller on an SDN is designed to control
the forwarding operations of the switches in a centralized
manner. Thanks to this flexibility and programmability, the
SDN technology has been leveraged by various cybersecurity
network applications. In this section, we discuss the types of
MTD techniques, attack behaviors considered, key methodolo-
gies, and evaluation methods considered and/or used for MTD
technologies developed for SDN environments.
MTD Techniques: IP shuffling / mutation based MTD is pop-
ularly used in SDN environments by leveraging OF switches
and a centralized SDN controller [78, 79, 100, 138] where the
SDN controller makes packet forwarding decisions at each
OF switch and decisions on the updates of the flow tables
at the switch. Network topology shuffling is also a well-
known MTD technique [2, 13] that has been applied in SDN
environments in order to minimize security vulnerabilities in
attack paths [69] by the SDN controller identifying an optimal
network reconfiguration. Scalability issue in SDN environ-
ments is also managed by the SDN controller which creates
scalable attack graphs [31]. An SDN-based packet header
randomization is proposed to realize unlinkability anonymity
in communications where the SDN controller and OF switches
take care of routing based on nonce information [143, 156].
Main Attacks: Common attacks considered in SDN-based
MTD approaches include reconnaissance (or scanning) at-
tacks [31, 66, 69, 78, 79, 85, 138] and DDoS attacks [13, 145],
which can be countermeasured by using random IP mutation
and/or network topology shuffling.
Key Methodologies: The key idea of deploying MTD tech-
niques in SDN environments is to highly leverage its cen-
tralized structure with an SDN controller to optimize the
configuration of the deployed MTD techniques, such as IP ran-
domization / shuffling [78, 79, 100, 138, 145], network routing
paths [68], attack graphs / paths [31], port hopping [85], packet
header randomization / obfuscation [143, 156], or virtual
topology generation [1]. The key concerns in developing SDN-
based MTD are resolving a scalability issue in an attack
graph [31] or IP shuffling [100] and optimizing both security
and performance in terms of minimizing security vulnerabil-
ities while minimizing defense cost and service interruptions
to users.
Evaluation Methods: Like other domains, simulation-based
validation methods are popular; but some emulation-based
testbeds are also developed for validating SDN-based MTD
(e.g., a Mininet emulator with an NOX SDN controller [79]).
Sharma et al. [138] used both probability-based and simulation
models to validate the proposed IP multiplexing / demultiplex-
ing MTD. Hong et al. [68] conducted security and performance
analysis of their proposed network topology shuffling-based
MTD in a real SDN testbed consisting of SDN-enabled
hardware switches and an SDN controller. Kampanakis et al.
[85] showed the performance of the proposed SDN-based port
hopping MTD based on Cisco’s One Platform Kit.
Fig. 13 shows an example deployment of an SDN-based
IP multiplexing / demultiplexing in which the SDN-controller
implements the IP shuffling-based MTD mechanism. This is
a centralized implementation of the SDN-based MTD at an
SDN-controller in which the DNS response is intercepted by
the controller which maps IP addresses and updates the flow
tables at OF switches.
Pros and Cons: SDN is a promising technology that can
provide flexibility, robustness, and programmability. This flex-
ibility and programmability features of the SDN technology
can be applied to several cybersecurity applications. The
programmable interface afforded by the SDN environments
can be comforted to implement proactive, adaptive defensive
mechanisms, such as MTD techniques. The highly effective,
scalable deployment of MTD can enhance system security and
resiliency with multiple SDN controllers organizing centrally
and hierarchically. The caveat is that introducing a hierarchical
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Fig. 13. An example deployment of IP multiplexing / demultiplexing in an
SDN environment [138].
structure to maintain multiple SDN controllers may introduce
extra overhead while it makes the SDN network highly scal-
able and can maximize the effectiveness of MTD. Therefore,
finetuning the critical tradeoff between performance (e.g., de-
fense cost and QoS) and security (e.g., security vulnerability)
is a must.
E. Cloud-based Web Services
Cloud computing embraces both Internet-based applications
provided as services such as hardware and system software in
the data centers delivering those services [11]. Could-based
web services have been developed with the motivation of
providing services based on centralized service management
that enables providing professional, consistent, and uniformed
quality services for all business unit services [57]. However,
the downside of the cloud-based centralized computing re-
sources exposes a single point of risk and/or failure, such as
‘putting all your eggs in one basket’ in which adversaries can
easily target to attack. Further, maintaining a homogeneous
computing infrastructure for uniform management of com-
puting resources can also lead to a single vulnerability [57].
MTD techniques have been explored to mitigate those security
vulnerabilities and/or failure.
Bardas et al. [18] proposed an MTD platform for cloud-
based IT system and analyzed security benefits to verify
its performance with an e-commerce scenario. The authors
studied how the MTD approach can be applied to the entire IT
system and demonstrated its practicality in cloud-based envi-
ronment using Automated eNterprise network COmpileR (AN-
COR) [151]. ANCOR is a framework for creating and manag-
ing the cloud-based IT systems. Their experimental evaluation
showed that MTD systems managed and deployed using the
proposed MTD approach increases attack effort/complexity.
MTD Techniques: The key MTD techniques addressed in the
cloud computing domain include shuffling server replicas [82],
VM migration [41, 120, 165], VM snapshotting [120], web-
application stack shuffling [132], or platform diversity /
migration [24, 25]. Since cloud-based web services take a
centralized management, we can observe the MTD strategies
are limited in changing configurations of system components,
rather than varying network topologies which are mainly
concerned in distributed environments.
Main Attacks: The common attacks considered in the existing
cloud-based MTD approaches are DDoS [82], VM colocation
attacks based on side channel attacks that can leak out private
information of users [165], eavesdropping and message forgery
/ modification / dropping [41], VM probing attacks [120],
database / script / mainstream hackers [132], or exploitation /
data exfiltration attacks [25]. Since cloud-based web services
may deal with a large volume of users’ private information, it
is noticeable that attacks leaking out the private information
is also one of key concerns MTD needs to counteract.
Key Methodologies: Bangalore and Sood [16] proposed the
Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance (SCIT), which is a new
concept for securing servers based on a virtualization tech-
nology to rotate the servers aiming to increase complexity for
attackers and reduce the possible losses due to detection and
prevention errors. Bangalore and Sood [16] further extended
their to design a Cloud-based SCIT [110] scheme for security
enhancement of the applications and the services deployed
in the Cloud. This approach is for a recovery-based intrusion
tolerance system (ITS) designed to leverage the characteristics
of the cloud computing and inter-cloud services. Nguyen
and Sood [111] also proposed an MTD-based self cleansing
intrusion tolerance (SCIT-MTD) for securing a scalable web
application services deployed in the cloud-based environments.
Jia et al. [82] proposed a replication method to make
potential targeted servers as moving targets that can be isolated
from adversaries. Further, the authors developed a client-server
reassignment algorithm to mitigate interruptions of the service
availability and quality. Zhang et al. [165] aimed to identify
an optimal interval of VM migration in order to maximize
security with minimum cost based on a game theory called
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. Danev et al. [41]
proposed a key structure to allow secure migration of virtual
Trusted Platform Modules (vTPMs) in private clouds. Peng
et al. [120] formulated a service security model in clouds that
can allow optimal configurations of VM migration / snapshot-
ting and diversity / compatibility of migration. Sengupta et al.
[132] adopted a repeated Bayesian Stackelberg game to model
a web-application stack shuffling MTD. Carter et al. [25] used
a leader-follower game to identify an optimal use of strategies
in choosing the right platform where their goal is to show that
deterministic strategies developed based on statistical analysis
outperforms simple random strategies.
Evaluation Methods: Like the validation trends observed in
other domains, most cloud-based MTD approaches are also
evaluated based on simulation and analytical models [82,
120, 165], concerning the effectiveness of MTD in terms of
security and cost. Jia et al. [82] used both simulation-based
and prototype-based evaluations (i.e., using Amazon EC) to
validate server shuffling-based MTD on clouds. Danev et al.
[41] integrated their proposed VM-vTPM migration MTD into
a Xen hypervisor for the performance and security analysis.
Peng et al. [120] conducted simulation-based performance
analysis under various conditions of attack surface and service
deployments. Carter et al. [24, 25] conducted a simulation
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Fig. 14. An example deployment of a cloud-based server-shuffling MTD [82].
study in order to investigate the effect of game strategies in
choosing platform migration on system security (i.e., mean
time to compromise or MTTC). Sengupta et al. [132] devel-
oped a real world MTD web application that can convert from
an application in Python to one in PHP and from a MySQL
database to a PostgreSQL database, or vice versa; and they
identified an optimal solution based on a real testbed.
Fig. 14 describes an example implementation architecture
of MTD for a cloud’s services in which server-replica of the
cloud-domain are shuffled [82].
Pros and Cons: The newer cloud technologies have embraced
the concept of infrastructure as a code; and an effective
deployment of MTD techniques in clouds not only strengthens
security, but also encourages innovation that leverages a new
way of handling and managing dynamic configurations and
infrastructure. With those technologies being leveraged, de-
ploying the MTD techniques in clouds are more feasible for
smaller and medium business houses as well as big enterprises
and government. Therefore, highly scalable and cost-effective
MTD deployment is allowed. However, it is inevitable to
face challenges to make a good balance between security and
performance in terms of minimizing security vulnerabilities
and defense cost while maximizing service availability.
X. LIMITATIONS
In this section, we summarize the limitations we realized
through the comprehensive survey conducted in this work as
follows:
• Limited investigations on the interplay between MTD
and other defense mechanisms: We have discussed event-
based MTDs in Section III that describes the use of other
defense mechanisms (i.e., IDS and/or IPS) to determine
when to trigger an MTD operation and change attack
surface. However, an attacker can take advantage of a system
with a static and fixed placement of the defense mechanisms.
Although one of MTD’s key roles is to assist other defense
mechanisms through cooperating with them, few prior work
have investigated the cooperative role [133, 32, 153]. These
approaches tackled the problem using an MTD approach
which dynamically changes the placement of the IDS. How-
ever, their scope is limited to the placement of the detectors
in the network. The MTD can help deploy other security
defense mechanisms (i.e., IDS, IPS, deception, firewall) by
cooperating with them as another layer of defense. However,
few prior works have investigated how MTD assists in
enhancing security and/or reducing the defense cost.
• Few studies investigating the effect of MTD on reducing
attacks beyond the reconnaissance stage: Most attack be-
haviors considered in the existing MTD works occur during
the reconnaissance stage. This implies that MTD mainly
deals with outside attackers as its primary goal is to protect a
system before they break into the system. This significantly
limits the applicability of MTD techniques although MTD
can enhance system security and performance by dealing
with attackers beyond the reconnaissance stage (e.g., inside
attackers).
• Lack of investigating the optimal deployment of mul-
tiple, hybrid MTD techniques: Hybrid MTD approaches
combining more than one technique among shuffling, di-
versity, and redundancy [4, 5, 6, 59] have been proposed
to maximize security. However, how to optimally deploy
multiple techniques in terms of minimizing defense cost and
maximizing system security and service availability has not
been investigated.
• Metrics used in the existing MTD approaches have
limitations in measuring multiple dimensions of a sys-
tem’s quality. The state-of-the-art MTD metrics mostly only
measure the effectiveness in terms of system security. A
few studies have tried to assess performability aspects of
the system but left out economical aspects (e.g., operational
and/or capital cost). We discuss how the three metrics
(i.e., security, performability, and economical costs) can be
considered in Section XI.
• Lack of realistic testbeds: Most MTD approaches have
been validated based on analytical and/or simulation mod-
els while emulation-based or real testbed-based evaluation
methods are rarely used. This indicates a critical need for
developing better experimental testbeds for the verification
and validation (V&V) to test the performance of diverse
types of MTD techniques.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we conducted a comprehensive survey on
MTD techniques, their key classifications, their key design
dimensions, common attack behaviors handled by the existing
MTD approaches, and application domains considered in the
MTD literature. For the future research, we summarized the
insights and lessons obtained from this survey paper and
addressed the future research directions in the MTD research.
A. Insights & Lessons Learned
We obtained the following insights and lessons from this
study:
• Proactive, adaptive, and affordable defense: MTD takes
a non-conventional perspective toward security, which aims
to enhance security by changing the attack surface, rather
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than eliminating all the vulnerabilities of system compo-
nents, representing the conventional security goal. Based on
this philosophy, MTD can provide a way to build proac-
tive, adaptive, and affordable defense mechanisms that can
leverage the existing technologies while enhancing system
security.
• Increased synergy in cooperation with other defense
mechanisms: By adding another layer of defense that can
proactively thwart potential attackers or hold inside attack-
ers’ actions, MTD can help an IDS detect intrusions more
effectively while providing an alternative defense strategy
to deal with vulnerabilities when deception is detected by
an attacker.
• Importance of balancing multiple objectives: Although
MTD introduces another layer of defense that can enhance
security, it also generates overhead and may interrupt ser-
vices to be provided to legitimate users. The thorough
analysis of critical tradeoffs between multiple objectives is
necessary to improve the state-of-the-art MTD technology.
• Customized MTD dealing with unique characteristics of
different application platforms: We noticed that different
types of MTD have been developed to deal with the unique
characteristics of different application domains in order to
fully leverage the advanced legacy technologies to maximize
the effectiveness and efficiency of MTD.
• Diverse solution techniques for developing MTD: Al-
though game theoretic MTD approaches are dominant
among all, other optimization techniques based on genetic
algorithms or machine learning have been explored.
• Validation of the performance of MTD with diverse met-
rics: The effectiveness and efficiency of MTD are measured
by using a variety of metrics in terms of the perspectives of
both an attacker and defender.
• Effective and efficient evaluation methods developed
to ensure the verification and validation (V&V) of
MTD: Most MTD approaches have been validated based on
simulation or analytical model-based experiments. But some
existing approaches conducted experiments under more re-
alistic environments using emulation or real-testbed based
evaluation methods.
Although we could obtain the insights and lessons from the
comprehensive survey conducted in this work, we felt the
future research should be geared toward the right direction.
We discuss the future research directions as below.
B. Future Research Directions
We suggest the following future research directions in the
MTD research domain:
• A better MTD classification needs to be developed.
Although we used the operation-based MTD classification
based on shuffling, diversity, and redundancy, it only cap-
tures ‘how-to-move.’ It does not capture other criteria such
as ‘when to move’ or ‘what to move.’ We need to develop
an MTD classification that can comprehensively embrace
multi-dimensions of MTD properties which can provide a
better understanding of key MTD operations.
Fig. 15. Security, performability, and economical MTD metrics.
• More adaptive MTD mechanisms need to be developed.
In the state-of-the-art MTD technology, the concepts and
techniques of adaptive MTD are still immature. The adap-
tivity in triggering MTD operations can be achieved based
on the level of system vulnerabilities or attack patterns /
strength, which requires the advanced detection or learning
capability of the defender. How to learn an attacker’s action
and/or system security conditions is vital for the defender
to make decisions for the optimal MTD deployment.
• Lightweight MTD should be developed with high gran-
ularity of meeting the needs for highly contested envi-
ronments. MTD can be a good defense solution to protect
military tactical environments, where resources are often
severely restricted and communications between nodes are
fully distributed, requiring a fully autonomous decision
process. However, most MTD approaches addressed in the
state-of-the-art do not provide highly lightweight, distributed
solutions. Lightweight, secure MTD should be built to meet
multiple, conflicting objectives of the contested, tactical
environments.
• More useful metrics are needed to maintain service avail-
ability to users. While MTD introduces enhanced security,
it may also hinder service availability to legitimate, normal
users. However, most metrics are focused on measuring
system security or attack success. Since the system has
multiple objectives to meet in terms of security, defense
cost, and service availability, there should be a balance
to develop meaningful, useful metrics that can capture the
impact introduced to users in terms of service quality.
• The effectiveness and efficiency of MTD should be
measured by system metrics embracing security, per-
formability, and economical costs introduced by the
MTD. As shown in Fig. 15, we can consider the three
metrics (i.e., security, performability, and economical cost)
to evaluate MTD techniques. Security metrics can measure
the effectiveness of the MTD while performability metrics
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can estimate the efficiency of the MTD. Moreover, the
economical costs introduced by using the MTD should
be considered particularly when MTD is implemented in
real systems. Hence, finding critical tradeoffs between these
three metrics should be investigated in the evaluation stage.
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